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Algorithmic Opacity, Private
Accountability, and Corporate Social
Disclosure in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence
Sylvia Lu*
ABSTRACT
Today, firms develop machine-learning algorithms to control
human decisions in nearly every industry, creating a structural tension
between commercial opacity and democratic transparency. In many of
their commercial applications, advanced algorithms are technically
complicated and privately owned, which allows them to hide from legal
regimes and prevents public scrutiny. However, they may demonstrate
their negative effects—erosion of democratic norms, damages to
financial gains, and extending harms to stakeholders—without
warning. Nevertheless, because the inner workings and applications of
algorithms are generally incomprehensible and protected as trade
secrets, they can be completely shielded from public surveillance. One of
the solutions to this conflict between algorithmic opacity and democratic
transparency is an effective mechanism that requires firms to disclose
information about their algorithms.
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This Article argues that the pressing problem of algorithmic
opacity is due to the regulatory void of US disclosure regulations that
fail to consider the informational needs of stakeholders in the age of
artificial intelligence (AI). In a world of privately owned algorithms,
advanced algorithms, as the primary source of decision-making power,
have produced various perils for the public and firms themselves,
particularly in the context of the capital market. While the current
disclosure framework has not considered the informational needs
associated with algorithmic opacity, this Article argues that algorithmic
disclosure under securities law could be used to promote private
accountability and further public interest in sustainability.
In this vein, through the lens of the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) disclosure framework, this Article proposes a new
disclosure framework for machine-learning-algorithm-based AI systems
that considers the technical traits of advanced algorithms, potential
dangers of AI systems, and regulatory governance systems in light of
increasing AI incidents. Towards this goal, this Article considers
numerous disclosure topics, analyzes key disclosure reports, and
proposes new principles to help reduce algorithmic opacity, including
stakeholder interests, sustainability considerations, comprehensible
disclosure, and minimum necessary disclosure, ultimately striking a
balance between democratic values in transparency and private interests
in opacity. This Article concludes with a discussion of the impacts,
limitations, and possibilities of using the new disclosure framework to
promote private accountability and corporate social responsibility in the
AI era.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed the private sector’s dominance in
developing algorithms.1 Today, algorithms have flourished, presenting
new business applications in nearly every industry.2 From conventional
commuting options to emergency medical treatments, algorithms have
increasingly penetrated every corner of daily life, implying a foreseeable
future in which they can influence every human decision.3 Algorithms
are becoming a primary source of decision-making power, but are often
privately owned and inscrutable, which allows them to hide from legal
regimes and prevents regulators from understanding and reviewing
them. Thus, every service an algorithm performs—from data collection
and training to business applications that have decision-making power
over humans—may demonstrate a substantial degree of danger to the
larger public.4

1.
Since 2013, the number of AI start-ups and firms has strikingly increased, and
investment in machine-learning systems tripled, leading to the growing influence of AI systems
on high-tech industries. Xiaohong Quanieee & Jihong Sanderson, Understanding the Artificial
Intelligence Business Ecosystem, 46(4) IEEE ENG’G MGMT. REV. 22, 22 (2018); Gil Press, Top 10
Hot Artificial Intelligence (AI) Technologies, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2017, 9:09 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2017/01/23/top-10-hot-artificial-intelligence-ai-technologies/#25b983f31928 [https://perma.cc/Z3HJ-UBPT] (“A Narrative Science survey found last year
that 38% of enterprises are already using AI, growing to 62% by 2018. Forrester Research
predicted a greater than 300% increase in investment in artificial intelligence in 2017 compared
with 2016. IDC estimated that the AI market will grow from $8 billion in 2016 to more than $47
billion in 2020.”); see also Dresner Advisory Services, 2019 DATA SCIENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING
MARKET STUDY REPORT (2019), https://gumroad.com/l/dTfno [https://perma.cc/KC98-VMTP]
(“[B]usiness units and IT departments are the likely centers of data science and machine learning
oversight, with R&D ownership showing the fastest growth in 2019.”).
2.
AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE & BUNDESKARTELLAMT, Algorithms and Competition
1, 1 (2019), https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/algorithms-and-competition.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV7W-GG49] (recognizing big data and algorithms as the most
important driving technological forces that revolutionize many sectors of the economy).
3.
See Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66
UCLA L. REV. 54, 56 (2019) (noting that “algorithms determine the optimal way to produce and
ship goods, the prices we pay for those goods, the money we can borrow, the people who teach our
children, and the books and articles we read—reducing each activity to an actuarial risk or
score.”); Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg,
David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2017); see
also PETER STONE, RODNEY BROOKS, ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, RYAN CALO, OREON ETZIONI, GREG
HAGER, JULIA HIRSCHBERG, SHIVARAM KALYANAKRISHAN, ECE KAMAR, SARIT KRAUS, KEVIN
LEYTON-BROWN, DAVID PARKES, WILLIAM PRESS, ANNALEE SAXENIAN, JULIA SHAH, MILIND TAMBE
& ASTRO TELLER, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030: ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, REPORT OF THE 2015-2016 STUDY PANEL (2016).
4.
Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1183, 1186
(2019) (“[B]ecause their inner workings are often protected as trade secrets, they can remain
entirely free from public scrutiny.”); see also Jenna Burrell, How the Machine
‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1
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Employed in AI systems within a “black box,” algorithms are
accompanied by an opacity that has covertly led to problems affecting a
wide range of stakeholders.5 Since 2016, Facebook’s AI-based services
have been subject to ceaseless investigations, lawsuits, and class-action
suits. Due to its operating results of advanced algorithms, Facebook has
already been accused of data privacy violations,6 fomenting division and
inciting violence in Myanmar,7 discrimination in Facebook’s job-seeking
service,8 and breach of the Fair Housing Act.9 On an individual level,
many AI systems are prone to discriminate against minorities.10 For
instance, health care algorithms used to predict patient diseases
discriminate against African Americans;11 secret AI recruiting tools are
biased against females;12 and algorithms have been found to label
homosexual and Jewish individuals negatively.13 On a societal level,
(2016); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018).
5.
See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 217–18 (2015); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115
MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2017). For the purpose of this Article, stakeholders refer to those who
play a key role in deciding the value of AI systems, including but not limited to investors,
employees, algorithm developers, suppliers, and local communities.
6.
Guy Rosen, Security Update, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 28, 2018, 9:41 AM),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/09/security-update/ [https://perma.cc/632K-A7J8].
7.
Alexandra Stevenson, Facebook Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myanmar,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/myanmar-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/JB9J-EH5R].
8.
Josh Eidelson, Facebook Tools Are Used to Screen Out Older Job Seekers, Lawsuit
Claims, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0529/facebook-tools-are-used-to-screen-out-older-job-seekers-lawsuit-claims
[https://perma.cc/
8MDZ-5928].
9.
Terrence Dopp & Jesse Westbrook, Facebook Violated Fair Housing Act with Ad
Practice, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 28, 2019, 7:13 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201903-28/facebook-violated-fair-housing-act-with-ad-practice-hud-charges [https://perma.cc/TQU7QYN9].
10.
Katyal, supra note 3, at 69 (“Bad data, in other words, can perpetuate inequalities
through machine learning, leading to a feedback loop that replicates existing forms of bias,
potentially impacting minorities as a result.”).
11.
Cf. Monique Tello, Racism and Discrimination in Health Care: Providers and Patients,
HARV. HEALTH BLOG, https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/racism-discrimination-health-careproviders-patients-2017011611015 [https://perma.cc/9V5S-SYJC] (last updated July 9, 2020, 12:34
PM) (discussing the issue of health disparities resulting from racism and discrimination in the
United States).
12.
Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against
Women, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2018, 6:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobsautomation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showedbias-against-womenidUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/24JH-APAB].
13.
Andrew Thompson, Google’s Sentiment Analyzer Thinks Being Gay Is Bad, VICE (Oct.
25, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/j5jmj8/google-artificial-intelligence-bias
[https://perma.cc/JT4P-SY2U].
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algorithms seem to absorb the biases, inequality, and even violence that
ultimately plague society. This is particularly relevant in the
COVID-19 Pandemic, where black patients and other minority
individuals have been suffering and dying from COVID-19 at a
disproportionate rate.14 In all of these cases, algorithms that have the
power to manipulate human decisions are shielded from public scrutiny
due to the public’s technical illiteracy and the trade secret protection
algorithms receive. Despite a growing body of regulations in the United
States, the law has failed to protect individual rights encroached upon
by algorithms that are free from surveillance.15 Within a decade, a
growing number of AI-related incidents have emerged, demonstrating
their erosion of democratic norms and harm to citizens, including
discriminatory and unfair treatments with respect to individuals’
employment, housing, and medical care.16
As consumers and citizens have struggled with incidents arising
from opaque algorithms, corporate shareholders have also become
victims of algorithmic opacity in business. While firms increasingly rely
on algorithms as weapons to gain an advantage over competitors, the
problem of algorithmic opacity has produced a number of deleterious
outcomes for corporate shareholders and the capital market.17 Without
public scrutiny, algorithm-based services have led to a series of legal
and managerial issues unanticipated by their corporate shareholders,
particularly in the age of AI. For example, investors with significant
stakes in AI businesses suffer from misuse of data and other AI-related
misconduct that leads to enhanced remediation costs, reputation

14.
See, e.g., Eboni G. Price-Haywood, Jeffrey Burton, Daniel Fort & Leonardo Seoane,
Hospitalization and Mortality among Black Patients and White Patients with Covid-19, 382 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2534 (2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJMsa2011686?url_ver=Z39.882003&rfr_id=ori%3Arid%3Acrossref.org&rfr_dat=cr_pub++0pubmed
[https://perma.cc/XG8EG5TN].
15.
Katyal, supra note 3, at 59 (“At the same time, the law can fail spectacularly to address
this discrimination because of the rhetoric of objectivity and secrecy surrounding it.”); see Paul
Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American Legal
Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1345 (1992).
16.
Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and
Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106 (2019).
17.
Katia Porzecanski, JPMorgan Commits Hedge Fund to AI in Technology Arms Race,
BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-02/jpmorgan-to-start-ai-hedge-fund-strategy-in-technology-arms-race
[https://perma.cc/6WSC-992V]
(“JPMorgan has spent billions in the technology arms race with rivals . . . deploying AI and
machine-learning in investment banking and tapping industry experts to help shape
strategy. . . . [O]ver the longer-term, [AI and machine-learning hedge funds have] outperformed
other computer-driven funds.”).
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damage, and damage to their firms’ long-term shareholder value.18 In
the previously mentioned case of Facebook, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) imposed corporate governance reforms and fined
Facebook a $5 billion penalty for violating the FTC’s order by
misrepresenting consumer privacy. This fine was the largest fine in the
privacy sphere, representing 23 percent of Facebook’s 2018 profit and
was twenty times larger than the maximum General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) fine.19 Not only had Facebook’s stock prices dropped
to their lowest in nearly twenty-two months in November 2018,20 but as
of December 2018, Facebook was ranked the least trustworthy of the
major high-tech firms.21 Excluded from public oversight, algorithmic
operations can also result in uncertain market conditions, immature
business strategies, and changing regulatory environments,
threatening the interests of corporate shareholders and adversely
affecting consumers and the efficiency of the broader capital market.22
“Opacity culture” that dominates the development of new
businesses is a major impediment to corporate accountability.23 In the
18.
See AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE & BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra note 2, at I
(pointing out how advanced algorithms may have “detrimental effects on the competitive
functioning of markets, especially by facilitating collusive practices.”).
19.
See Lesley Fair, The FTC’s $5 Billion Facebook Settlement: Record-Breaking and
History Making, FED. TRADE COMM’N BUS. BLOG (July 24, 2019, 8:52 AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlementrecord-breaking-history [https://perma.cc/R8SM-L3NB]; Aarti Shahani & Avie Schneider, FTC to
Hold Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Liable for Any Future Privacy Violations, NPR (July 24,
2019, 12:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/24/741282397/facebook-to-pay-5-billion-to-settleftc-privacy-case [https://perma.cc/DUD8-V836]; What if My Company/Organisation Fails to
Comply with Data Protection Rules?, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/dataprotection/reform/rules-business-and-organisations/enforcement-and-sanctions/sanctions/what-ifmy-company-organisation-fails-comply-data-protection-rules_en [https://perma.cc/RLQ7-Q6XJ]
(last visited Sept. 15, 2020). Some of the FTC Commissioners even considered this fine as
insufficient to deter Facebook from future violations, as Facebook may have earned billions of
dollars due to violations of the FTC order. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit
Chopra at 15–16, In re Facebook, Inc. (2019), No. 182-3109, 2019 WL 3451729 (F.T.C.)
(2019); Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter at 2, In re Facebook, Inc.,
No. 182-3109, 2019 WL 3451729 (F.T.C.) (2019).
20.
Salvador Rodriguez, Here Are the Scandals and Other Incidents that Have Sent
Facebook’s Share Price Tanking in 2018, CNBC (Nov. 20, 2018, 10:22 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/20/facebooks-scandals-in-2018-effect-on-stock.html
[https://perma.cc/63CX-64PM].
21.
Sarah Feldman, Facebook Loses the Public’s Trust, STATISTA (Dec. 14, 2018),
https://www.statista.com/chart/16431/tech-company-trust/ [https://perma.cc/KJN3-PALV].
22.
See generally Saqib Aziz & Michael Dowling, Machine Learning and AI for Risk
Management, in DISRUPTING FINANCE 33 (Theo Lynn et al. eds, 2019) (exploring how machine
learning and AI solutions are transforming risk management in the private sector).
23.
See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 113, 116 (1999); Elliot J. Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountability, 34 BUS. LAW.
575, 576–77 (1979) (“Disclosure . . . is the oil that lubricates the machinery of the governance
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field of corporate governance, scholars, regulators, and stakeholders
have long viewed disclosure regulations as an effective mechanism to
ensure corporate accountability.24 In the United States, disclosure
regulations are the responsibility of multiple government agencies,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).25 As a lead
agency protecting the capital market and investor interests, the SEC
emphasizes transparency as a responsibility of every market
participant and cooperates with government agencies, market
participants, and investors to monitor opacity threats.26 Although the
SEC has established disclosure requirements for public firms, the
current disclosure framework does not consider the informational needs
associated with algorithmic opacity.
Because the emerging risks caused by algorithms are so
revolutionary, potentially catastrophic, and messier than before,
this Article argues that firms should adequately disclose the operating
results of their algorithms not only concerning the interests of their
investors but also those of other stakeholders in AI systems.27 Similar
to climate change concerns that justify SEC sustainability disclosures,
algorithms with considerable social risks should also legitimize
disclosure as a requisite for firms that develop advanced algorithms.28
Riskier than cyberattacks that legitimize the SEC cybersecurity

system.”); Sustainable Investment Joins the Mainstream, ECONOMIST (Nov. 25,
2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/11/25/sustainable-investmentjoins-the-mainstream [https://perma.cc/8FP2-E4F7].
24.
Fox, supra note 23, at 116; Weiss, supra note 23, at 577; Sustainable Investment Joins
the Mainstream, supra note 23.
25.
See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 427 (2003).
26.
See Structured Disclosure at the SEC: History and Rulemaking, U.S. SEC. EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/page/osdhistoryandrulemaking [https://perma.cc/KMG4-HJHD].
(last updated May 21, 2020). For an analysis of the SEC’s performance on enforcing securities law,
see Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679 (2012).
27.
Stakeholders call for “an assessment of how AI systems can be made transparent,
predictable and verifiable so as to effectively prevent distortion, discrimination, manipulation and
other forms of improper use.” AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE & BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra note
2, at 77; see also VERBRAUCHERZENTRALE BUNDERSVERBAND, Algorithmic Decision Making for the
Benefit of Consumers, 1, 3–4, https://www.vzbv.de/sites/default/files/downloads/2019/07/19/19-0625_vzbv_positions_adm_control_summary_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC44-NDUP] (last visited
Nov. 10, 2019).
28.
See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-61469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 211,
231, 241) [hereinafter SEC Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure].
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disclosure,29 advanced algorithms are unprecedentedly causing danger
to every corner of daily life,30 and thus desperately necessitate
algorithmic disclosure in the current landscape of corporate
disclosure.31
To fill this regulatory void, this Article explores how a disclosure
framework in securities laws could be used to encourage algorithmic
accountability and transparency in the age of AI. As the current
disclosure framework has failed to consider the information needs
associated with algorithmic opacity, this Article argues that algorithmic
disclosure in the context of corporate governance could further
corporate shareholder and public interest in sustainability.32 By
proposing a new algorithmic disclosure framework integrated with
mandatory and recommended disclosure requirements that take
account of commercial, technical, and social considerations in
accountability, this Article hopes to better align capital markets with
algorithmic accountability and sustainability.
After a brief introduction to AI in Part II, this Article discusses
how algorithms are applied in privately owned AI systems by looking
at three critical industries: financial services, medical services, and
transportation services. Part III turns to the issues of technical and
legal algorithmic opacity, examines how democratic norms, such as
privacy, equality, and safety, have been traded for algorithmic opacity,
and discusses how the existing law responds to dangers derived from
algorithm-based services in each context. Turning toward the disclosure
framework in the context of SEC securities laws, Part IV investigates
how current practices apply to AI systems. Since the current disclosure
framework fails to consider the informational needs of stakeholders in
AI systems, this Article proposes a new disclosure framework for
advanced-algorithm-based AI systems that takes into account
commercial, technical, and social considerations to meet the needs of
stakeholders in the digital age. Part VI concludes with a brief discussion
29.
See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity
Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-82746, 83 Fed. Reg. 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018) (codified at 17
C.F.R. §§ 229, 249) [hereinafter SEC Statement and Guidance on Cybersecurity Disclosures].
30.
See Hin-Yan Liu, The Power Structure of Artificial Intelligence, 10 L.
INNOVATION & TECH. 197, 205 (2018).
31.
THE IEEE GLOBAL INITIATIVE ON ETHICS OF AUTONOMOUS AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS,
ETHICALLY ALIGNED DESIGN: A VISION FOR PRIORITIZING HUMAN WELL-BEING WITH AUTONOMOUS
AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 7, 159 (2017).
32.
Corporate sustainability refers to a business enterprise’s creation of long-term value
both for its economic profits as well as the benefits of stakeholders affected by its commercial
practices or policies. For an in-depth discussion of different definitions of corporate sustainability,
see Marcel van Marrewijk, Concepts and Definitions of CSR and Corporate Sustainability, 44(2)
J. BUS. ETHICS 95 (2002).
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of the impacts, limitations, and possibilities of using the algorithmic
disclosure framework to regulate algorithmic opacity toward
accountability and sustainability in the AI era.
II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ALGORITHMS
To solve the problems of algorithmic opacity, it is necessary to
understand AI and algorithms. AI refers to a form of intelligent
computing that employs algorithms to maximize its chance of solving
problems or achieving goals.33 Based on computational intelligence,
algorithms can undertake intellectual activities, such as perception,
inference, reasoning, learning, and adapting.34 AI systems are a class of
algorithms that reflect varying degrees of human-like consciousness,
autonomy, and intelligence. On a continuum between tool-like and
human-like systems, the least advanced AI systems depend on
preprogrammed rules to evaluate options or make decisions.35 In
contrast, more advanced AI systems utilize a class of machine-learning
algorithms.36 Unlike rule-based AI systems, machine-learning-based AI
systems rely on the algorithm’s dynamic ability to learn from data,
identify patterns, make inferences, and reach solutions without explicit
instructions or human intervention.37 A subset of machine-learning
algorithms is “deep learning,” which employs artificial neural networks
that imitate human neural networks.38 Deep-learning algorithms can

33.
See Future of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017, H.R. 4625, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (2017).
34.
See TOSHINORI MUNAKATA, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1
(2008) (explaining the competencies of AI that include inference, reasoning, perception, learning,
control, prediction, classification, and optimization).
35.
A traditional algorithm depends on rules defined by human experts and “takes some
input and some logic in the form of code and drums up the output.” Richa Bhatia, How Does
Machine Learning Differ from Traditional Algorithms, ANALYTICS INDIA MAG. (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://analyticsindiamag.com/how-do-machine-learning-algorithms-differ-from-traditional-algorithms/ [https://perma.cc/FA6A-44CW].
36.
Dresner Advisory Services, supra note 1 (“advanced initiatives related to data science
and machine learning, such as data mining, advanced algorithms, and predictive analytics”); see
Louis Columbus, State of AI and Machine Learning in 2019, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2019, 2:38 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2019/09/08/state-of-ai-and-machine-learning-in2019/#78edaf6e1a8d [https://perma.cc/3BSL-5UUV].
37.
For an introduction to recent advances in machine-learning algorithms, see Andreas
Holzinger, Markus Plass, Michael Kickmeier-Rust, Katharina Holzinger, Gloria Cerasela Crişan,
Camelia-M. Pintea & Vasile Palade, Interactive Machine Learning: Experimental Evidence for the
Human in the Algorithmic Loop, 49(7) APPLIED INTELLIGENCE 2401 (2019).
38.
For recent breakthroughs in deep learning techniques, see Yann LeCun, Yoshua
Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436 (2015); Bernard Widrow & Michael A.
Lehr, 30 Years of Adaptive Neural Networks: Perceptron, Madaline, and Backpropagation, 78
PROCS. IEEE 1415 (1990).
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process data through multiple layers to identify patterns and extract
concepts.39
The advancement of data storage, process, and analysis
technologies is the engine of powerful algorithms, which rely heavily
on raw data to provide solutions.40 For example, machine-learning
algorithms—the subset of algorithms extensively used by the private
sector—need sufficient data to reach solutions.41 In a business context,
AI systems in particular require massive amounts of data to
understand customer needs and requirements. Facebook, Google, and
Amazon use significant amounts of raw data to continually refine their
products and services, which in turn attracts more users and yields
even more data.42
Additionally, technology that helps effectively acquire and
process data also plays a crucial role in the success of powerful AI
systems. For instance, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as
smartphones, allow millions of human speech samples to be recorded
and processed by AI hardware.43 Combined with algorithms
encompassing machine-learning techniques, IoT systems continually
evolve and improve their effectiveness.44 In addition, computing power
technologies, such as expert systems and machine learning, allow AI
systems to address a vast number of problems with superior
capability.45 The integration of cloud computing also facilitates the
storing of data and provides a platform to create and test AI systems.46
With progressive algorithmic improvement and copious amounts of
data used to extract meaning, the power of AI systems continues to rise
significantly.

39.
LeCun et al., supra note 38, at 436 (“Deep learning allows computational models that
are composed of multiple processing layers to learn representations of data with multiple levels of
abstraction.”).
40.
Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 16, at 121–22.
41.
See Michael Chui, Nicolaus Henke & Mehdi Miremadi, Most of AI’s Business Uses Will
Be in Two Areas, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 20, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/most-of-ais-businessuses-will-be-in-two-areas [https://perma.cc/ZHG5-9B6R].
42.
Gil Press, How Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Google and Microsoft Made 2018 the Year
that IT Mattered A Lot, FORBES (Dec. 30, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gil
press/2018/12/30/how-apple-amazon-facebook-google-and-microsoft-made-2018-the-year-that-itmattered-a-lot/#6d68e9761cee [https://perma.cc/KG8R-GXPC].
43.
Quanieee & Sanderson, supra note 1, at 22–23.
44.
See id.
45.
See id. at 23.
46.
See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1623, 1626–34 (discussing the use of the cloud). For an introduction to the technological
distinctions among different models of cloud computing, see Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to the
Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1690, 1694–95 (2018).
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A. Algorithms and AI Systems in the Private Sector
Over time, the business applications of AI systems have
tremendously increased. Currently, the use of AI systems has almost
become every technology firm’s focus of development, quickly
transforming commercial services and products.47 In commercial
practices, algorithms are being integrated into products and services
that exhibit varying degrees of automated functions.48 AI technology
has penetrated a number of industries, including transportation,
telecommunications, financial services, medical services, retail, and
real estate, among others.49 With human-like reasoning and inference
abilities, AI systems perform tasks and provide solutions for firms to
build products, services, or business models in various industrial
sectors.50 With machine-learning algorithms, some AI systems can
continually improve at a speed unmatched by human beings.51 Firms
are also utilizing AI systems as a tool to better understand customer
complaints and needs.52 Currently, algorithm-based commercial
functions play a key role in financial services, transportation, and
medical services.
1. Financial Services
In financial services, algorithms are transforming retail
investments and credit. As an example, robot advisory services, like
Betterment, provide an online financial advisor that offers clients
financial management suggestions and optimal investment
strategies.53 Robot advisory services are based on algorithms that
collect and parse client information regarding clients’ past performance
and risk preferences.54 Such business applications of AI systems have
47.
Bernard Marr, Why Every Company Needs an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Strategy for
2019,
FORBES
(Mar.
21,
2019,
1:23
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/03/21/why-every-company-needs-an-artificial-intelligence-ai-strategy-for2019/#6ef657a368ea [https://perma.cc/6URB-MF6J].
48.
Id.
49.
STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 4.
50.
Id.
51.
See, e.g., Chris Baraniuk, The Cyborg Chess Players that Can’t Be Beaten, BBC
FUTURE (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20151201-the-cyborg-chess-playersthat-cant-be-beaten [https://perma.cc/HVH5-7DMP] (discussing how the computing power of AI is
succeeding against chess grandmasters).
52.
Quanieee & Sanderson, supra note 1, at 23.
53.
Choosing a Robo-Advisor: Investing Made Personal, BETTERMENT, https://www.betterment.com/category/robo-advisor/ [https://perma.cc/747S-74NQ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).
54.
See Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial
Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 718, 726 (2018).

2020]

ALGORITHMIC DISCLOSURE OF AI SYSTEMS

111

disrupted traditional advising practices by offering personalized digital
investment advice to clients at a low cost.55
Similarly, AI systems coupled with machine-learning
algorithms are showing a remarkable ability to capture, process, and
utilize data factored into credit calculations. Several digital lenders
have made predictions of borrowers’ creditworthiness based on
machine-learning algorithms.56 At the request of digital lenders,
borrowers install applications to their digital devices, allowing
algorithms to track and obtain comprehensive data on their mobile
devices.57 In this way, digital lenders can access borrowers’ social media
profiles, the types of computers they use, their shopping preferences,
and the places they have visited, which allow algorithms to underwrite
consumer credit risk.58
2. Transportation Services
Algorithms have revolutionized the transportation industry
with the creation of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology and
driverless cars. The integration of massive amounts of data, real-time
sensing, and connectivity technology has led to the success of GPS
systems and driverless cars by improving traffic and route predictions.59
With GPS technology, drivers are guided by stored map information
that can choose an optimal route based on the shortest path algorithm.60
At the same time, the GPS navigation system collects information about
transportation patterns and provides the collected data to firms.61
Currently, vehicles have a variety of capabilities that integrate
real-time sensing and decision-making functions, such as airbag control
systems that protect driver safety by using algorithms that can detect
55.
See Overview of Betterment’s Pricing, BETTERMENT (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.betterment.com/resources/pricing-overview/ [https://perma.cc/349L-NQ97] (last visited Sept. 12,
2020).
56.
Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K. Hallisey, “Equality and Privacy by Design”: A New
Model of Artificial Intelligence Data Transparency Via Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor
Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428, 466–67; see William Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the
Bitcoin Era, 23 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 159, 183–84 (2018).
57.
Matt Hamblen, Lenders May Eye Smartphone Use Before Giving You a Loan, COMPUT.
WORLD (Dec. 4, 2015, 11:01 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3012140/lenders-mayeye-smartphone-use-when-deciding-on-loans.html [https://perma.cc/226L-7B7K].
58.
See id.
59.
See Jeffrey L. Duffany, Artificial Intelligence in GPS Navigation Systems, in 1 2010
2ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING V1-382
(Houssain Kettani & Yang Li eds., 2010).
60.
See id. at V1-386.
61.
See Joe Grengs, Xiaoguang Wang & Lidia Kostyniuk, Using GPS Data to Understand
Driving Behavior, 15 J. URBAN TECH. 32, 32, 34 (2008).
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crashes to trigger airbags.62 Driven by advances in machine-learning
algorithms’ ability to perceive their surroundings, tech giants, such as
Waymo, Nvidia, Tesla, and Uber, have created autonomous cars.63 As
of July 2019, Waymo’s autonomous cars logged more than ten billion
miles.64 Additionally, Tesla’s autopilot can drive autonomously, while
requiring drivers to monitor the car and take control on short notice.65
In the near future, advances in algorithms’ sensing and reasoning
abilities will be followed by improvements in machine-learning
driving-assist algorithms.66 When coupled with advanced algorithms,
the self-driving car can reduce drivers’ navigating chores, traffic
congestion, and accidents caused by human error.67 In the future,
algorithms employed by autonomous vehicles may eventually be
applied to other types of transportation like remote-controlled trucks or
flying cars.68
3. Medical Services
AI systems in medical services are concerned with employing
algorithms to emulate human perception in processing health data
without direct human intervention. Today, algorithms have been
applied to a wide range of medical services, including diagnosis
processes, treatment decision support, patient monitoring, surgery
assistance, new drug development, personalized medicine and care, and
management of health care systems.69 Recently, successful AI health
care has been closely associated with the use of data and
machine-learning algorithms. For example, data has been collected
62.
William J. Fleming, New Automotive Sensors: A Review, 8(11) IEEE SENSORS J. 1900,
1909 (2008).
63.
See Andrea Miller, Some of the Companies That Are Working on Driverless Car
Technology, ABC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2018, 2:03 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/companies-workingdriverless-car-technology/story?id=53872985 [https://perma.cc/6UBS-SL4R].
64.
Darrell Etherington, Waymo Has Now Driven 10 Billion Autonomous Miles in
Simulation, TECH CRUNCH (July 10, 2019, 4:17 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/10/waymohas-now-driven-10-billion-autonomous-miles-in-simulation/ [https://perma.cc/KT35-YWCB].
65.
Autopilot and Full Self-Driving Capability, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/support/autopilot (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
66.
STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 20.
67.
Id. at 20–21.
68.
Antony Riley, The Algorithm at the Heart of Autonomous Truck Safety, MEDIUM (Jan.
27, 2018), https://medium.com/@antonyriley/the-algorithm-at-the-heart-of-autonomous-trucksafety-5be09203e5dc [https://perma.cc/VKN6-MJKH]; Jack Stewart, Airbus Uses Lasers to Teach
Its Flying Car to Land, WIRED (Aug. 23, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/airbus-vahana-flying-car-landings/ [https://perma.cc/K6LX-KX9P].
69.
The AI Industry Series: Top Healthcare AI Trends to Watch, CB INSIGHTS,
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/ai-trends-healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/S8AU-N6Q5]
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019); see Quanieee & Sanderson, supra note 1, at 23.
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from social media profiles to predict users’ health risks through
machine-learning algorithms, and robots are being used in surgical
procedures.70 With algorithms, millions of patient medical records can
be mined to produce more accurate diagnoses and effective
treatments.71 Data from wearable devices can also be a valuable source
for creating personalized medical diagnoses.72 For example, Enlitic, a
machine-learning company, builds deep-learning algorithms to develop
medical services that streamline radiology diagnoses.73 The firm uses a
deep-learning platform to analyze medical data, including but not
limited to patient medical records, radiology images, blood tests, and
genomics to generate diagnoses that consider patients’ personal
situations.74 The AI firm PathAI also uses machine-learning algorithms
to help pathologists produce more precise cancer diagnoses for
patients.75 The firm uses algorithms to analyze high volumes of patients
with greater accuracy in diagnoses and developing methods for
individualized medical treatments.76
From the financial industry to the health care industry,
algorithms are gaining importance in the private sector, quickly
reshaping commercial services and human lives. Collectively, these
developments suggest a near future in which algorithms affect every
action or decision made by humans. Despite their growing influence,
the inner workings of algorithms are often unavailable for public
investigation, operated by firms in opacity.77 The opacity of algorithms
is derived from algorithms’ inherent complexity as well as a legal
70.
Sam Daley, 32 Examples of AI in Healthcare that Will Make You Feel Better About the
Future, BUILT IN, https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/artificial-intelligence-healthcare
[https://perma.cc/F8QL-SU5Z] (last updated July 29, 2020); Arunima Roy, Katerina Nikolitch,
Rachel McGinn, Safiya Jinah, William Klement & Zachary A. Kaminsky, A Machine Learning
Approach Predicts Future Risk to Suicidal Ideation From Social Media Data, NPJ DIGIT. MED.,
May 26, 2020, at 1.
71.
Krista Conger, Computers Trounce Pathologists in Predicting Lung Cancer Type,
Severity, STAN. MED. NEWS CTR. (Aug. 16, 2016), https://med.stanford.edu/news/allnews/2016/08/computers-trounce-pathologists-in-predicting-lung-cancer-severity.html
[https://perma.cc/G85N-VDFZ].
72.
STONE ET AL., supra note 3, at 27.
73.
See Enlitic Brings Deep Learning Diagnostic Solutions to the Radiological Society of
North America, ENLITIC (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.enlitic.com/enlitic-brings-deep-learning-diagno [https://perma.cc/7C2S-LRUB].
74.
Id.
75.
Emily Inverso, Medicine Gets Digital: How Data Is Pushing Healthcare Forward,
FORBES (Oct. 2, 2017, 11:43 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilyinverso/2017/10/02/medicinegets-digital-how-data-is-pushing-forward-healthcare/#18b7b29a13f7
[https://perma.cc/M5CCFT42].
76.
PATHAI, https://www.pathai.com/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2020).
77.
Michael Luca, Jon Kleinberg & Sendhil Mullainathan, Algorithms Need Managers,
Too, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 98.
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system that allows algorithms to operate in secrecy.78 Without public
surveillance, algorithmic opacity has led to a number of issues that
negatively affect consumers, investors, other individual stakeholders,
and society as a whole.
III. THE PERILS OF ALGORITHMIC OPACITY
Advancements of algorithms have manifested the hazards of AI
systems throughout the private sector. As AI systems use algorithms to
perceive the world, the opacity problems with algorithms are quietly
expanding in the business world with the support of machine-learning
algorithms.79 The following Section discusses the nature of algorithmic
opacity, looks into the perils of algorithmic opacity that involve social,
economic, and technical concerns, and explains why such dangers
require information disclosure for public oversight.80
A. Algorithmic Opacity
Algorithmic opacity is defined as the lack of visible processes to
scrutinize the inner workings and resulting applications of
algorithms.81 Algorithmic opacity can take the form of technical opacity
or legal opacity. Technical opacity typically occurs in advanced
machine-learning algorithms, whereas legal opacity is pervasive
regardless of the type of algorithm.82 Both types of opacity can prevent
stakeholders and government agencies from understanding and
monitoring the design and application of algorithms that involve a
number of ethical, legal, and managerial issues. The issue of
algorithmic opacity, broadly termed as a “black box” by Professor Frank
Pasquale, refers to the invisibility and complexity of advanced
algorithms that hinder effective investigation of AI systems.83

78.
See Burrell, supra note 4, at 3–5; see also Han-Wei Liu, Ching-Fu Lin & Yu-Jie-Chen,
Beyond State v. Loomis: Artificial Intelligence, Government Algorithmization and Accountability,
27 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 122 (2019) (discussing the unsolved challenges of legal black box as
well as technical black box associated with the rise of data analytics and algorithms).
79.
Burrell, supra note 78, at 1–12; Liu et. al., supra note 78.
80.
Burrell, supra note 78, at 1–12; Liu et. al., supra note 78.
81.
See Pragya Paudyal & B.L. William Wong, Algorithmic Opacity: Making Algorithmic
Processes Transparent Through Abstraction Hierarchy, 62 PROC. HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS
SOC’Y ANN. MEETING 192, 193 (2018).
82.
For instance, during its learning process, a neural network doesn’t “break down
handwritten digit recognition into subtasks that are readily intelligible to humans.” Burrell, supra
note 4, at 6.
83.
See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
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1. Technical Opacity
Technical opacity occurs in machine-learning algorithms
in which evolving computational processes are too complicated
for humans to understand.84 Because the data structure of
machine-learning algorithms continually evolves, the inner workings of
algorithms are difficult to analyze, particularly in terms of how results
are reached.85 For example, in a deep-learning algorithm, the neuron
network is composed of layers of neurons working in a loose manner
to reach a decision.86 Here, the algorithm’s structure can be
incomprehensible to human cognition. At the same time, the neural
network learns from experience, making its decision-making process
even more intuitive, complex, and thus unpredictable.87 The technical
opacity inherent in machine-learning algorithms thus allows
algorithms to learn and adapt without human understanding or
control.88 Accordingly, as “the Godfather of Deep Learning” Geoffrey
Hinton observes, “[a] deep-learning system doesn’t have any
explanatory power . . . the more powerful the deep-learning system
becomes, the more opaque it can become.” 89
2. Legal Opacity
Unlike technical opacity in machine-learning algorithms, legal
opacity occurs across a wider range of algorithms, regardless of the
subset of algorithms involved. The origin of legal algorithmic opacity is
the result of legal structures that provide overlapping intellectual

84.
See IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BENGIO & AARON COURVILLE, DEEP LEARNING 1–4
(2016) (explaining how the tasks undertaken by AI projects, such as image recognition, data
pattern identification, or language processing, may be easy for humans to perform, but hard to
describe); see also Davide Castelvecchi, Can We Open the Black Box of AI?, NATURE (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://www.nature.com/news/can-we-open-the-black-box-of-ai-1.20731 [https://perma.cc/K42NYBM8].
85.
See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 84, at 1–2; see also Castelvecchi, supra note 84.
86.
See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 84, at 13–16. Currently, a neuron network may,
at the high end, consist of hundreds of thousands of interconnected artificial neurons working to
reach a decision. See id. at 21–22.
87.
Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and
Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 897 (2018) (noting that advanced machining-learning
algorithms are capable of learning from data and experiences that produce unforeseeable
decision-making process and results).
88.
See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 532, 539
(2015) (discussing the unpredictable behaviors of robots that “can lead to solutions no human
would have come to on her own”).
89.
Siddhartha Mukherjee, A.I. Versus M.D., NEW YORKER (Apr. 3, 2017).
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property protection in algorithms.90 Currently, the inner workings and
applications of algorithms are generally protected by firms as trade
secrets, and thus hidden from public scrutiny.91 As Professor Sonia
Katyal recently observed, this current state is the result of a drawback
of intellectual property law that incentivizes trade secrecy of
algorithms.92
For decades, algorithms were independently protected by three
intellectual property regimes—copyright law, patent law, and trade
secret law.93 At different periods, each regime has dominated the
protection in algorithms, but the law of trade secrecy has most
consistently reigned. Firms have relied on trade secret law since the
early years of software development, as it provided necessary protection
against misappropriation.94 Later, despite the subsequent rises and
falls of both copyrightability and patentability for algorithms,95 courts
became reluctant to provide patent protection for algorithms.96 While
the copyright regime tends to protect the secrecy of source code, courts
have limited copyrightability in algorithms due to their functionality;97
trade secret law thus continues to dominate the landscape of algorithms
protection.98
90.
Katyal, supra note 4, at 1190 (“[S]oftware garnered a unique position within the
law: it remains one of the few spheres to enjoy concurrent protections from trade secrecy, copyright
law, and patent law.”).
91.
Id. at 1236. (“As a result of these shortcomings of intellectual property protection to
incentivize disclosure and access, source code remains entirely secluded from outside view,
maximizing the developer’s control, irrespective of whether the goals of third party access lie in
innovation, competition, or investigation.”).
92.
Id. at 1227, 1236.
93.
Id. at 1190.
94.
Id. at 1190, 1227; see also Richard Raysman, Protection of Proprietary Software in the
Computer Industry: Trade Secrets as an Effective Method, 18 JURIMETRICS J. 335, 344 (1978).
95.
See Pamela Samuelson, Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the Shadow
of Patents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 243 (2019).
96.
Even though there has been a rise of open-source movement, trade secrets remain
developers’ primary avenue for software protection. In the 1980s, courts in the United States began
to admit copyrightability of algorithms and attempted to broaden the scope of copyright protection,
but at the same time struggled to limit copyrightability in algorithms due to their functionality.
Katyal, supra note 4, at 1203–07, 1216–25; see also Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information
Platforms, 1 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 6–16, 22–31 (2002) (discussing the open-source
movement).
97.
During the 1960s, the United States Patent Office refused patents for algorithms. It
was not until the 1981 case of Diamond Diehr that courts decided to acknowledge software
patentability. Since then, the courts further extended the boundary of software patentability in
several cases, such as Alappat, State Street, and AT&T. In response to the overbroad boundaries
of software protection, the courts and Congress began to narrow software patentability in cases
including In re Bilski and Alice. After Alice, courts tended to oppose granting patents for software,
which were often characterized as abstract ideas. Katyal, supra note 4, at 1216–25.
98.
Id. at 1225.
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There are several reasons for the domination of trade secret
protection of algorithms over patent and copyright law. First, compared
to the changing and uncertain boundaries of patent and copyright,
trade secret law provides more stable protection for developers to secure
their legal rights and averts risks of losing protection.99 Second, while
both patent and copyright law encourage a certain extent of information
disclosure, trade secret law promotes opacity that is more aligned with
firms’ strategic and marketing needs.100 Third, an algorithm is a form
of specialized information that can be naturally free from public
interpretation and difficult to reverse engineer,101 which allows firms to
maintain their secrecy at a lower cost.102 Fourth, copyright and patent
regimes are less beneficial to algorithms, as copyright law does not
provide an exclusive right prohibiting others from independently
creating similar algorithms, and patent law fails to protect algorithms
once the functional architecture of an algorithm is modified and falls
outside the original claims of the patent.103 For these reasons, trade
secret law has become the most favorable avenue for firms to protect
algorithms, and even those derived from the public domain have been
claimed as trade secrets.
Furthermore, algorithms can maintain core secrecy at all times,
even if they only fall under the protection of patent or copyright law.104
As Professor Katyal observes, although copyright and patent law
encourage dissemination of information, neither require “disclosure of
much of the source code.”105 Accordingly, under the protection of
intellectual property law, firms are incentivized to keep the process and
business applications of algorithms secret, raising a number of concerns
for larger stakeholders in the context of business applications.
B. The Values Compromised by Algorithmic Opacity: Privacy,
Equality, and Safety
Algorithmic opacity has led to a number of harmful outcomes to
society that threaten democratic norms and stakeholder interests.
99.
Id. at 1216.
100.
James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 177–78
(2005).
101.
See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrecy as IP Rights,
61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 338–41 (2008).
102.
Katyal, supra note 4, at 1214; Lemley, supra note 101, at 333–34.
103.
INT’L TECH. L. ASS’N, RESPONSIBLE AI: A GLOBAL POLICY FRAMEWORK 263 (2019),
https://www.itechlaw.org/sites/default/files/Responsible_AI.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8TS-SB4P].
104.
Katyal, supra note 4, at 1226 (“[S]ource code remains secret at all times, irrespective
of whatever regime it falls under.”).
105.
Id. at 1188.
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There are three concrete, fundamental rights of citizens endangered by
algorithmic opacity: privacy, equality, and safety. Based on the
increasing pervasiveness of machine-learning-based business
applications in financial services, transportation services, and medical
services, the following Sections use these services as representative
examples to discuss how existing laws and regulations respond to the
emerging problems posed by algorithmic opacity.
1. Trading Privacy for Opacity
In AI firms, algorithms crafted to further consumer interests can
simultaneously sacrifice consumer privacy if they operate without
adequate oversight. The foundation of powerful algorithms is access to
data. The more relevant information there is in an accessible data set,
the more capable algorithms are of performing a task or making an
effective decision.106 However, incentivized by current legal structures,
firms often collect and use consumer data without supervision when
building AI systems. For example, IoT technologies allow firms to
obtain large quantities of data in numerous databases and are often
used to facilitate the collection and analysis of consumer data.107 Once
a massive amount of consumer data has been collected, algorithms can
use that data to influence or control consumers in AI systems.108 Despite
the IoT providing virtually every movement of consumers to firms, the
collection and use of consumer data remains opaque.109 This opacity
leads to significant information asymmetry with consumer privacy as
the unknowing victim.
Similarly, in the case of financial services, consumers
unknowingly trade their private information for AI services. Digital
lenders often require borrowers to install cell phone applications that
constantly track and collect data in users’ digital devices, including
information concerning social media profiles, website visit history, and
shopping preferences, among others.110 Landlords and retailers use
106.
See Artificial Intelligence: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS INST.,
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/what-is-artificial-intelligence.html
[https://perma.cc/8KWK-HJ3H] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
107.
Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 16, at 123 (discussing how IoT is being utilized in the
private sector and how the application of IoT produces information asymmetry).
108.
Dirk Helbing, Bruno S. Frey, Gerd Gigerenzer, Ernst Hafen, Michael Hagner, Yvonne
Hofstetter, Jeroen van den Hoven, Roberto V. Zicari & Adrej Zwitter, Will Democracy Survive Big
Data and Artificial Intelligence?, SCI. AM. (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-democracy-survive-big-data-and-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/PZL6-ABBQ].
109.
Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 16, at 123.
110.
See also Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Natasha Singer, Michael H. Keller & Aaron
Krolik, Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES
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data collected from mobile phones to pinpoint their target customers.111
Moreover, Amazon sells facial-scan technology that analyzes customers’
faces to detect their reactions to and interests in displays and
products.112 US shopping centers have started to adopt technology that
collects information on consumers’ behavior patterns, facial features,
and lengths of stay.113
The large-scale collection and use of data can erode information
privacy and even manipulate decisional privacy—the autonomy to
make decisions about private actions without intrusion or
intervention.114 Firms collect consumer data to examine the behavior
patterns of consumers, feed their algorithms, and use them to tailor
products, services, and advertisements that target consumers’ income
levels for private benefit.115 Retailers use algorithms to track
consumers’ moves and reactions in shopping malls to improve product
displays and marketing.116 Firms increasingly use consumers’ private
information for their commercial profits, often secretly.117 The way
firms use algorithms to target consumers according to their income
levels, desires, and needs constitutes a subtle form of manipulation
known as “behavioral marketing.”118 Behavioral marketing covertly
surrenders informational privacy; such manipulation may gradually
erode individuals’ free will to make decisions.119

(Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacyapps.html [https://perma.cc/F58L-AD93].
111.
James Green, 3 Ways Customer Data Allows for Pinpoint Marketing, ENTREPRENEUR
(July 24, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/247372 [https://perma.cc/7NAN-2ARZ].
112.
Kate Fazzini, Amazon’s Facial Recognition Service Is Being Used to Scan Mugshots,
but It’s Also Used to Track Innocuous Things Like Soccer Balls, CNBC (Dec. 6, 2018, 11:13 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/06/how-amazon-rekognition-works-and-what-its-used-for.html
[https://perma.cc/KE4V-ZASN].
113.
Esther Fung, Shopping Centers Exploring Facial Recognition in Brave New World of
Retail, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shopping-centers-exploring-facial-recognition-in-brave-new-world-of-retail-11562068802 [https://perma.cc/K4C3-EMSY].
114.
See ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, Decisional Privacy, in A DOLESCENCE, PRIVACY, AND THE
LAW: A DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 16 (2016).
115.
See Eden Gillespie, Are You Being Scanned? How Facial Recognition Technology
Follows You, Even as You Shop, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2019, 9:11 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/24/are-you-being-scanned-how-facial-recognition-technology-followsyou-even-as-you-shop [https://perma.cc/U7WR-25NH]; DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ,
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 803–04 (6th ed. 2018).
116.
Fung, supra note 113.
117.
See Gillespie, supra note 115.
118.
For a discussion of legal issues surrounding online behavioral advertising, see Steven
C. Bennett, Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 899 (2011).
119.
Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 16, at 130 (arguing that online behavioral advertising
subverts consumers’ free will and erodes consumers’ autonomy to make decisions).
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In the United States, the government has not enacted federal
legislation that regulates how much firms should disclose concerning
their usage of algorithms and how to obtain consent in terms of
individual data collection.120 At the federal level, although numerous
statutes provide privacy protection, different statutes regulate different
industries, forming a complex regulatory landscape.121 For instance, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is the
primary act that requires protection of patient privacy, which limits the
types of medical records that can be utilized in algorithms to some
extent.122 However, as Professors Daniel Solove and Paul Schwartz
describe, there is no federal statute directly regulating personal
information collected by most businesses.123 Currently, the FTC is the
primary agency regulating privacy in the United States, with the power
to prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”124 Although the FTC has issued a set of principles on the
use of online behavioral marketing,125 without binding regulations in
place, only firms conducting unfair or deceptive business practices can
be investigated.126 This is inadequate because such a regulatory
sanction does not apply to firms’ large-scale collection and use of data
that may ultimately surrender consumers’ information privacy or
decisional privacy. While Congress has held hearings on the subject, no
bills have been passed to fill the void.127
On the other hand, some states have stricter privacy statutes
than federal laws,128 such as California, which passed the strongest
privacy protections in the United States so far.129 Recently,
120.
For the US system of consumer data privacy regulation, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 115, at 786–90.
121.
Id. at 786.
122.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 262(a), 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
123.
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 115, at 786–87.
124.
Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, sec. 201(a), § 5(a), 88 Stat. 2193,
2193 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)). For a further discussion of the FTC’s
approach to policing the marketplace, see Paul M. Schwartz, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106
GEO. L.J. 115, 147–50 (2017).
125.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING 46–47 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federaltrade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-advertising/p085400
behavadreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/TKP2-K56W].
126.
See Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 124.
127.
Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 16, at 131.
128.
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 115, at 789.
129.
Passed in 2018, the California Consumer Privacy Act provides consumer protection
for residents of California, regardless of where the data is processed. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1798.140(c) (2018).
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Washington, Texas, and Illinois passed bills to protect privacy with
respect to biometric information, followed by others considering
measures that would protect faces and other physical attributes.130
Although some states have attempted to regulate firms’ controversial
business practices, few laws and regulators are given power to regulate
borderless digital practices that may erode privacy norms.131
Accordingly, AI firms are only self-regulated, which means in some
contexts few or no sanctions combat the increasing privacy invasions
arising from opaque commercial applications.132
2. Trading Equality for Opacity
The health care industry has been one of the industries that has
witnessed the growing number of AI business applications and their
extending harms to equality produced by algorithmic opacity.133 From
predicting who will be diagnosed with cancer to deciding who will
receive medical treatment, algorithms are increasingly making
decisions that humans would have made.134 However, since the ways in
which the health care industry collects and uses data are kept from
public oversight, algorithms have been found to replicate systemic
discrimination present in the data and perpetuate disparities.135
Algorithm-based health care systems can replicate bias in a
number of ways. Risk-prediction algorithms built on patient health
records can reproduce discrimination already deeply rooted in society.
Machine-learning algorithms may underrepresent or overrepresent
patient cohorts, creating discriminatory AI systems and inferior
treatment of minorities. Racial discrimination has been replicated by
algorithms in the health care industry, affecting access to medical
treatment for millions of Americans.136 Recently, a study published in
130.
Molly K. McGinlyey & Kenn Brotman, The Biometric Bandwagon Rolls On: Biometric
Legislation Proposed Across the United States, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/biometric-bandwagon-rolls-biometric-legislation-proposed-across-united-states
[https://perma.cc/5DJB-KGWL].
131.
See Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 16, at 161.
132.
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 115, at 787.
133.
See Daley, supra note 70.
134.
Yanisky-Ravid & Hallisey, supra note 56, at 431–32 (illustrating “[m]any decisions
previously determined by humans are now made by autonomous AI systems”).
135.
See Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil Mullainathan,
Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366 (6464)
SCIENCE 447, 447 (2019); Irene Dankwa-Mullan, Examining Health Disparities in Precision
Medicine, IBM (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson-health/examining-health-disparities-in-precision-medicine/ [https://perma.cc/KQ82-KNR3].
136.
Kara Manke, Widely Used Health Care Prediction Algorithm Biased Against Black
People, BERKELEY NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019), https://news.berkeley.edu/2019/10/24/widely-used-health-
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Science found that the Impact Pro program—an AI system developed
by a health care firm—prioritizes white patients over black patients by
giving black patients unreasonably low risk scores despite their
poorer health conditions.137 This study showed that bias in algorithms
has affected over half of the black patients who should have access to
high-risk health care management programs and that these algorithms
have been found to discriminate against at least a hundred million US
citizens in their health care decisions.138 In another example, a study
on hypertrophic cardiomyopathy revealed that genetic misdiagnoses
can cause health disparities.139 In research on a cardiac disease
commonly caused by gene mutations, Black Americans were more
frequently misclassified as pathogenic, although they received positive
reports for the genetic variants.140 During the COVID-19 Pandemic,
structural racism replicated by advanced algorithms also contributed to
unequal treatment in the health care industry and consequently
increased the risks COVID-19 poses for people of color.141 As the Black
Lives Matter movement brings the issue of biases to the forefront, more
and more research indicates that black people are more likely to suffer
serious illness and death from COVID-19 than white people, in part due
to their limited access to medical treatment.142 In all these cases,
because firms develop their AI systems in a black box, the hidden bias
embedded in firm-owned algorithms has been difficult to detect and
eliminate. As a result of these discriminatory AI health care services
operating in opacity, minorities end up receiving inferior health care

care-prediction-algorithm-biased-against-black-people/?fbclid=IwAR21ND23XtA6GZXKLBe15
SajborPwJaGi2gksEek7o5Ju1Kea9JM1lf3IiE [https://perma.cc/DUN6-AZMR].
137.
See Obermeyer et al., supra note 135.
138.
Id. at 447–49.
139.
Arjun K. Manrai, Birgit H. Funke, Heidi L. Rehm, Morten S. Olesen, Bradley A.
Maron, Peter Szolovitz, David M. Margulies, Joseph Loscalzo & Isaac S. Kohane, Genetic
Misdiagnoses and the Potential for Health Disparities, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 655, 656 (2016).
140.
Id.
141.
US: Covid-19 Disparities Reflect Structural Racism, Abuses: Human Rights Watch
Testimony to US House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (June
10, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/10/us-covid-19-disparities-reflect-structural-racismabuses [https://perma.cc/5NAJ-FSDG].
142.
Kristen MJ Azar, Zijun Shen, Robert J. Romanelli, Stephen H. Lockhart, Kelly Smits,
Sarah Robinson, Stephanie Brown & Alice R. Pressman, Disparities in Outcomes Among
COVID-19 Patients in a Large Health Care System in California, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 1253
(2020); Roni Caryn Rabin, Black Coronavirus Patients Land in Hospitals More Often, Study Finds,
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/23/health/coronavirus-black-patients.html [https://perma.cc/8Q2V-C5UK]; Sherita Hill Golden, Coronavirus in African Americans
and Other People of Color, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/covid19-racial-disparities [https://perma.cc/SCR3-XHQ8].
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treatment and become sicker due to inequalities reproduced by
algorithms.
Even in the health care industry, the US government has
adopted a conservative approach to regulating inequality. To date,
there are few nondiscrimination rules applying to the development of
machine-learning algorithms and the use of AI systems.143 The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) prohibits insurance firms
from using genetic information to deny employment.144 However,
regulations designed for AI medical services that require continual
review are lacking.145 Currently, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has been hesitant to approve innovative health care AI systems
because of the underlying safety risks and unknown cost-benefit
trade-offs of AI systems.146
Even in such a strict regulatory environment, algorithmic
opacity derived from algorithm-based medical services brings
consistent dangers of inequality, which are difficult to investigate and
are not necessarily illegal.147 As Optum, an AI health care company, has
admitted, algorithms empowered to make medical decisions for humans
should be continually reviewed, refined, and provided with
socioeconomic information.148 Yet without binding legislation and
regulations, industry standards that prioritize profit over the public

143.
For the paucity of the principle of nondiscrimination that applies to algorithms, see
Katyal, supra note 3, at 100–03.
144.
See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
145.
See AI NOW INST., AI NOW REPORT 2018, at 23–24, 30–32.
146.
See Charles Aunger, Should the FDA Regulate AI?, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2019, 9:45 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/08/14/should-the-fda-regulateal/#3088165c39a0 [https://perma.cc/PSM5-MZKQ] (“In 2014, the FDA approved AI-based
algorithms for medical use, and in 2018, it issued its first approval of an AI system for diagnosis
without human clinical input.”); see also Conor Hale, FDA Delivers Regulatory Guidance on AI
Software and Clinical Decision-Making Aids, FIERCEBIOTECH (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/medtech/fda-delivers-regulatory-guidance-ai-software-and-clinical-decisionmakingaids [https://perma.cc/SBW4-D4KN] (“[T]he FDA said it plans to focus oversight on higher-risk
software functions, including those used in serious or critical situations—as well as machine
learning-based algorithms, where the program’s logic and inputs may not be fully explained to the
user.”).
147.
Katyal, supra note 3, at 97.
148.
Carolyn Y. Johnson, Racial Bias in a Medical Algorithm Favors White Patients over
Sicker Black Patients, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/10/24/racial-bias-medical-algorithm-favors-white-patients-over-sickerblack-patients/ [https://perma.cc/V44Q-L893] (“‘Predictive algorithms that power these tools
should be continually reviewed and refined, and supplemented by information such as
socio-economic data, to help clinicians make the best-informed care decisions for each patient,’
Optum spokesman Tyler Mason said.”).

124

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:1:99

good are unlikely to change.149 Accordingly, algorithms can reproduce
and deepen inequities in health care or other industries as long as they
are owned by firms and are proprietary in nature, making it difficult
for stakeholders and governments to monitor them.150
3. Trading Safety for Opacity
Algorithms develop rapidly to serve humans. However, without
adequate surveillance, their misbehaviors or malfunctions may cause
injury or death, either because hurting humans can achieve their set
goal, or they are simply miscalculated.151
Concerns about safety can be traced to the invisible use of data,
the unknown programming of algorithms, and the unforeseeable and
uncontrolled features of some machine-learning algorithms. As stated
above, the workings of algorithms depend heavily on the input of
data.152 When the input of data is ambiguous, biased, or falsified, output
becomes erroneous and unreliable.153 If the veracity and neutrality of
data go unverified, algorithms can amplify wrong information when
utilized in a business context, similar to the discrimination problem
seen in algorithm-based medical services.154
When the algorithms of an AI system are deficient, risks will
inevitably arise, as AI systems are only as good as the quality of their
algorithms.155 In a business context, algorithms may struggle when
reacting to scenarios unanticipated by their programming or when the
data input is insufficient for them to reach effective solutions. In the
case of robot advisory services, if market environments are uncertain,
algorithms may risk offering suboptimal or harmful operating results.
149.
Id.
150.
Katyal, supra note 3, at 59 (discussing how inequalities replicate existing bias through
machine learning and adversely impact minorities).
151.
See, e.g., Faiz Siddiqui, Tesla Floats Fully Self-Driving Cars as Soon as This Year.
Many Are Worried About What That Will Unleash, WASH. POST (July 17, 2019, 9:16 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/17/tesla-floats-fully-self-driving-cars-soonthis-year-many-are-worried-about-what-that-will-unleash/ [https://perma.cc/97PA-74RT].
152.
See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 671, 680, 688 (2016).
153.
Id.
154.
Kroll et al., supra note 3, at 680 (“These decision rules are machine-made and follow
mathematically from input data, but the lessons they embody may be biased or unfair
nevertheless.”).
155.
Willem Sundblad, Data Is the Foundation for Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/willemsundbladeurope/2018/10/18/data-is-the-foundation-for-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/#65bca29451b4 [https://perma.cc/X8BG-FN2F] (“Any application of AI and ML will only be as
good as the quality of data collected.”).
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Accordingly, such algorithms may increase risks rather than further
consumer interests and business efficiency.
Furthermore, machine-learning algorithms are designed with
features that implicate their unpredictability and the inability to
control them because their solutions are based on subsequent
experiences and not limited by preset rules.156 Even if the programming
of algorithms is clear and understandable, the interplay between
massive data and that programming creates complexity beyond
human comprehension.157 Additionally, because the decision logic of
machine-learning systems changes according to their post-design
experiences, even the human that develops the algorithms can neither
control nor predict their actions.158 In this context, control is difficult to
maintain, as machine-learning algorithms adapt and learn based on
their subsequent experiences.159
Given the invisible operation of data and algorithms that
hinders the surveillance of AI systems, a number of safety concerns
have been identified in the private sector. As exemplified by
autonomous vehicle incidents, algorithms have caused several serious
injuries. In the driverless car industry, algorithms performing
decision-making tasks are privately designed and tested on humans,
often with little public surveillance.160 In 2018, Uber confirmed that a
woman was killed by one of its self-driving cars, which failed to
“see” her when navigating the Phoenix suburbs.161 Tesla’s autonomous
vehicle killed a driver in an accident caused by its autopilot

156.
See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges,
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 365 (2016); Burrell, supra note 4, at 5.
157.
Anjanette H. Raymond, Emma Arrington Stone Young & Scott J. Shackelford,
Building a Better HAL 9000: Algorithms, the Market, and the Need to Prevent the Engraining of
Bias, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 220–21 (2018) (“Machine learning, by contrast, is used
to analyze patterns and then apply results to decision making and actions. All computing
processes, from mining to learning, in some sense rely on algorithms, but their scope, complexity,
and conceptual accessibility varies widely.”).
158.
Scherer, supra note 156, at 365–66.
159.
See id. at 366.
160.
Faiz Siddiqui, Silicon Valley Pioneered Self-Driving Cars. But Some of Its Tech-Savvy
Residents Don’t Want Them Tested in Their Neighborhoods, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2019, 10:16 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/03/silicon-valley-pioneered-self-drivingcars-some-its-tech-savvy-residents-dont-want-them-tested-their-neighborhoods/
[https://perma.cc/MCL8-E5XG] (“California has awarded permits to 63 different companies to test
self-driving vehicles on state roads, according to state figures from Aug. 9.”).
161.
Sam Levin & Julia Carrie Wong, Self-Driving Uber Kills Arizona Woman in First
Fatal Crash Involving Pedestrian, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2018, 6:48 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/19/uber-self-driving-car-kills-woman-arizona-tempe
[https://perma.cc/ZH2D-XEQQ].
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technology.162 Neither firm substantially suffered from these incidents.
In the Uber incident, although Uber had disabled the car’s
automatic-brake systems, the assisting driver was found liable for the
incident.163
In spite of these fatal incidents, few federal laws have been
enacted to monitor the development of these algorithms.164 Recently,
Waymo, a self-driving car company, launched new plans for an “early
rider program,” which invites volunteer residents to be driverless car
test subjects.165 The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is
the lead US governmental agency responsible for the investigation of
civil transportation accidents, but it has no legal authority to require
firms to implement its recommendations.166 Some scholars suggest that
self-driving cars should be regulated under the existing legal system,
where car incidents occur without the engagement of machine-learning
algorithms. Alternatively, some argue that legal doctrines and liability
rules should treat humans and AI systems differently.167 Currently,
self-driving car accidents have not been classified into a specific
162.
Sean O’Kane, Tesla Hit with Another Lawsuit over a Fatal Autopilot Crash, VERGE
(Aug. 1, 2019, 5:59 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/1/20750715/tesla-autopilot-crash-lawsuit-wrongful-death [https://perma.cc/QP7C-S6WC] (“Tesla is being sued by the family of a
50-year-old man who died in a crash while using the company’s Autopilot advanced driver
assistance system. . . . Banner is the fourth known person to die while using Autopilot, and his
family is the second to sue Tesla over a fatal crash involving the technology. . . . The similarities
[of Tesla’s fatal Autopilot crashes] suggest that Tesla didn’t address this issue with Autopilot’s
ability to recognize a crossing tractor-trailer, regardless of the potential fault of the driver.”).
163.
David Shepardson, Update 3-NTSB Cites Uber, Distracted Backup Driver in Fatal
Self-Driving Crash, YAHOO! FIN. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/1-u-safety-boardchair-192153357.html [https://perma.cc/W8HW-U5QE].
164.
AI NOW INSTIT., supra note 145, at 23.
165.
Ellice Perez, Getting Ready for More Early Riders in Phoenix, WAYMO (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://blog.waymo.com/2019/08/getting-ready-for-more-early-riders-in.html
[https://perma.cc/
95L6-YVWV].
166.
See
Safety
Recommendations,
NAT’L
TRANSP.
SAFETY
BD.,
https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/RecTabs.aspx [https://perma.cc/
FT57-B8ZR] (“Safety recommendations are issued by the NTSB following the investigation of
transportation accidents and the completion of safety studies. Recommendations usually address
a specific issue uncovered during an investigation or study and specify how to correct the
situation.”).
167.
For further discussions, see Edmond Awad, Sohan Dsouza, Richard Kim, Jonathan
Schulz, Joseph Henrich, Azim Shariff, Jean-François Bonnefon & Iyad Rahwan, The Moral
Machine Experiment, 563 NATURE 59 (2018); Jason Millar, Ethics Settings for Autonomous
Vehicles, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: FROM AUTONOMOUS CARS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 20 (Patrick
Lin et al. eds., 2017); Jeffrey Gurney, Imputing Driverhood: Applying a Reasonable Driver
Standard to Accidents Caused by Autonomous Vehicles, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: FROM AUTONOMOUS
CARS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 51 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2017); Bryan Casey, Amoral
Machines, or: How Roboticists Can Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Law, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
231 (2017); Andrea Renda, Ethics, Algorithms and Self-driving Cars–A CSI of the ‘Trolley
Problem,’ CEPS POL’Y INSIGHT (Ctr. for Eur. Pol’y Stud., Brussels, Belg.), Jan. 2018.
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regulatory category.168 In 2018, Democratic senators refused to pass
legislation establishing a federal standard for autonomous vehicles, as
they worried that the technology remains immature and
underdeveloped.169 At the state level, a majority of states have
considered, but still have not enacted, rules for autonomous vehicles.
Four states issued rules for testing driverless cars in public, but none
address the disclosure of algorithms, nor the liability assignment for
self-driving and semi-self-driving car accidents.170 Due to the paucity of
safety regulations that monitor the design and development of
machine-learning algorithms, the miscalculations, misbehaviors, and
malfunctions of algorithms deviating from the expectations of
programmers can be difficult to correct, posing risks and injuries to the
larger public as a result.
C. Information Disclosure for Public Oversight as a Solution
With the increasing frequency and magnitude of hazards
associated with algorithmic opacity, machine-learning algorithms are
having a major impact on firms’ reputation, financial condition, and
long-term development. Algorithms can also disrupt the operating
results of public firms or their commercial alliances due to defects in
the AI systems that firms cannot find or repair in the development
process.171 Firms involved in AI incidents may bear enormous costs and
face damaging outcomes, such as lost revenues from system failures,
liability to class-action lawsuits and litigation, and the destruction of
reputation and shareholder value. Accordingly, firms should be
required to inform corporate shareholders about material risks and
incidents derived from advanced algorithms.172 Corporate shareholders
should be able to monitor firms to prevent the appearance of improper
168.
See Andrew J. Hawkins, Congress Takes Another Stab at Passing Self-Driving Car
Legislation, VERGE (July 28, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/28/8931726/congress-self-driving-car-bill-redo-2019 [https://perma.cc/4H4A-M59Y] (Congress is attempting to
pass new rules for driverless cars, but whether the new bill will be passed is still uncertain.).
169.
Daniel Araya, The Big Challenges in Regulating Self-Driving Cars, FORBES (Jan. 29,
2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielaraya/2019/01/29/the-challenges-with-regulating-self-driving-cars/#71e7514cb260 [https://perma.cc/5R7Z-XCVY].
170.
Sebastian Blanco, Florida Will Allow Autonomous Cars with No Safety Drivers on
Public Roads Starting July 1, CAR & DRIVER (June 18, 2019), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a28073922/florida-autonomous-cars-driverless/ [https://perma.cc/8FE5-WUFX].
171.
Sam Ransbotham, Shervin Khodabandeh, Ronny Fehling, Burt LaFountain & David
Kiron, Winning with AI: Pioneers Combine Strategy, Organizational Behavior, and Technology,
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Oct. 15, 2019), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/projects/winning-with-ai/
[https://perma.cc/37CP-QZBA] (pointing out that a growing number of AI firms perceive strategic
risks from using AI technologies).
172.
AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE & BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra note 2, at 77.
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trading and require consideration of preventative measures in the
context of AI business applications. Without disclosure requirements,
corporate insiders could trade their firms’ securities while hiding
material, nonpublic information that concerns the concrete risks faced
by firms due to algorithms. With mandatory disclosure requirements,
firms could help corporate shareholders and other stakeholders
understand the material impact of algorithms on firms’ economic profits
and sustainability.173 Moreover, the disclosure framework would
encourage firms to develop a management approach for addressing AI
incidents that the firm has experienced or is likely to experience.
To address the problem of algorithmic opacity that endangers
customers, investors, and other stakeholder interests, compelling
information disclosure is necessary to control risks created by the
operation of algorithms. As previous AI incidents have indicated, in a
digital world, algorithmic opacity presents increasing risks and dangers
to customers and to firms utilizing algorithms.174 As firms increasingly
rely on algorithms, society faces an evolving landscape of algorithmic
threats in which algorithms penetrate individuals’ lives through
manipulation, invasion of privacy, and racist classification, among
other ways. The threats associated with algorithmic opacity, in turn,
incur a substantial risk to the financial condition of firms, the interests
of shareholder benefits, the stability of capital market, and require SEC
regulatory instruments to decrease the acute danger posed by advanced
algorithms.
IV. SEC REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
Although algorithmic opacity seems to be a newly debated issue,
opacity as a threat to investors and modern capital markets has existed
in corporations for decades.175 Historically, mainstream public
discussion has long acknowledged the risks of opacity associated with

173.
Vox Creative, How AI Can Help Us Clean Up Our Land, Air, and Water, RECODE (Oct.
26, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.recode.net/ad/18027288/ai-sustainability-environment
[https://perma.cc/QKZ6-WEEN] (suggesting that AI should be used to facilitate sustainability).
174.
S.P. Kothari, Chief Economist & Dir., Div. of Econ. & Risk Analysis, SEC. EXCH.
COMM’N, Policy Challenges and Research Opportunities in the Era of Big Data (July 13,
2019) (stating that the unpredictability of some machine-learning algorithms deployed in
industries is inherently challenging for the SEC to monitor and regulate).
175.
See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,
9 J. CORP. L. 1, 1 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984).
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corporate accountability.176 More recently, with the rise of corporate
social responsibility (CSR), also termed “environmental, social and
governance,”177 corporations are increasingly required to promote social
policies by disclosing information in response to social issues under
corporate and securities laws.178 In the United States, the
amalgamation of disclosure obligations with public goals is evidenced
by a number of regulations issued by the SEC. From the 2010 guidance
on climate change disclosure to the recent conflict mineral reporting
rules,179 the SEC has established a disclosure framework that combines
key elements of CSR and risk-related reporting.180 Under the current
SEC disclosure framework, several industry-specific guides have been
issued for firms to fulfill its requirements.181
However, the SEC has not yet established any public rules that
specifically address AI systems and disclosures. In this vein, a firm is
not required to disclose its use of machine-learning algorithms in a
timely and specific manner. Currently, very few firms are known to
submit systematic and substantial algorithmic disclosures in their
reports filed to the SEC. Since little attention has been paid to how
firms disclose their use of algorithms under the current disclosure
framework, the following Section introduces an SEC disclosure
framework for public firms, discusses how it would apply to firms using
AI systems, points out its practical deficiencies in addressing
algorithmic opacity, and then proposes new disclosure requirements
that fix the problems surrounding algorithmic opacity.
A. A Brief Introduction to the SEC Disclosure Framework
The principal purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
was to ensure public availability of reliable and adequate information
about firms with publicly traded stocks.182 To achieve this objective, the
Act required a number of periodic and current reports to be filed with
the SEC. All firms subject to the Act must provide disclosure through
176.
For an introduction to corporate mandatory disclosure, see DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY
LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND MATERIALS 13–21 (2012).
177.
Corporate social responsibility refers to a business enterprise’s voluntary actions to
create its long-term value not only for its economic profits but also for the interests of stakeholders
affected by its commercial practices or policies. See Marrewijk, supra note 32, at 102.
178.
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by National Governments and Stock
Exchanges, HAUSER INST. FOR CIV. SOC’Y (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Cambridge, Mass.), Mar. 27, 2015.
179.
See SEC Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure, supra note 28.
180.
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-77599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916 (Apr. 22, 2016).
181.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.802(a)–(g) (2018).
182.
THOMAS HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 135 (7th ed. 2017).
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annual, quarterly, and current reports.183 When a firm is required to
file a disclosure document with the SEC, the requisite form generally
refers to the disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K, which lays out
a disclosure framework for nonfinancial disclosure filings.184 This, in
turn, creates a set of topics, principles, and standards for mandatory
disclosure. Specifically, the information provided should be clear,
comparable to competitors’ performance, and timely for investors to
make informed decisions. Pursuant to the regulation, public firms
should disclose relevant information that is likely to influence a
reasonable investor when voting or making investment decisions, which
is dubbed “material” information.185 The materiality standard applies
to key topics of disclosure, including business descriptions, legal
proceedings, risk factors, and so forth.186
The current SEC disclosure framework is inadequate to address
algorithmic opacity problems. Complex and opaque AI systems,
particularly those built with machine-learning algorithms, can impose
high informational costs on any group of stakeholders, be they
investors, customers, regulators, policy makers, or the public. The
invisible inner workings and applications of machine-learning
algorithms pose a formidable obstacle for regulators seeking to reduce
the risks entailed by algorithms. Despite this, firms’ filing reports to the
SEC barely describe the use of algorithms. Among those firms
disclosing AI services, most only mention algorithms and their risks
without providing technical and practical details. Under current
practices, outsiders are not allowed to understand, surveil, or evaluate
the inner workings and operating results of firms’ algorithms, the
substantial risks therein, and how firms are controlling those risks.
Under this regulatory gap, risks derived from opaque algorithms are
difficult to detect, preventing corporate shareholders and other
stakeholders from monitoring firms or gaining sufficient information to
make investment decisions.

183.
Id. at 136.
184.
Id.
185.
See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 446–47 (1976).
186.
On August 8, 2019, the SEC proposed an amended rule for the purpose of modernizing
several Items under the Regulation S-K, including the description of business, legal proceedings,
and risk factor disclosures. For a detailed introduction to the SEC’s recent proposal, see Gerald J.
Guarcini, Franc Del Fosse & Joanna Jiang, SEC Proposes to Modernize, Improve, and Simplify
Disclosure Framework Under Regulation S-K, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-proposes-to-modernize-improve-and-simplify-disclosure-framework-underregulation [https://perma.cc/4E96-7K7Y].
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B. Towards an Algorithmic Disclosure Framework
After an introduction to crucial components of the SEC
disclosure requirements, the Sections below outline how current
practices have furthered algorithmic opacity, causing the erosion of
democratic norms and damage to financial profits. Then, through the
lens of the SEC disclosure framework, this Article argues for a more
nuanced approach to requiring algorithmic disclosures that addresses
new perils derived from algorithmic opacity.
1. Materiality Standard
Materiality is the standard that establishes what information a
public firm is obligated to impart under securities laws. The basic
concept of “materiality” was formulated by the US Supreme Court in
TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., where the Court decided that
information is material if there is a strong probability that a reasonable
investor would have considered such information “as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information available” to the
public.187 Assessing materiality requires an evaluation of all the
relevant facts and circumstances at the time of reporting.188 Firms are
expected to consider both quantitative material and qualitative
information,189 as well as quantitatively small misstatements that may
be considered material.190
Under the current disclosure framework, the SEC has not
established an industry-specific materiality standard for AI systems.
Firms must decide whether the expressed requirements impose an
obligation to disclose certain topics. When firms prepare reports to be
filed with the SEC, they must consider the materiality of risks and
incidents caused by their algorithms and disclose any information that
a reasonable investor might consider crucial in voting or making
investment decisions. However, given the cost of disclosures and the
resulting concerns about their AI services, firms have a strong motive
to not disclose algorithm operations that are potentially deficient,
unequal, or harmful, making the risks posed by their algorithms

187.
TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449; see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-2, 240.12b-20.
188.
Ganino v. Citizens Utils., 288 F.3d 154, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2000).
189.
See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (Aug. 12, 1999). But see Kenneth C.
Fang & Brad Jacobs, Clarifying and Protecting Materiality Standards in Financial Statements: A
Review of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, 55 B US. LAW. 1039, 1039 (2000) (noting that
historically, materiality determinations often referenced a quantitative standard).
190.
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, supra note 189. But see Fang & Jacobs, supra
note 189, at 1039.
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difficult to detect by outsiders. Because the SEC does not specifically
require algorithmic disclosure, firms can omit information that involves
problematic operation of algorithms without being fined.
In addition, under the current materiality standard, firms are
only obligated to consider the interests of corporate shareholders. The
operating results may implicate broader concerns for the larger public
that are closely connected with firms’ reputation and profits and are
easy to conceal from public view. Although the use of algorithms may
be considered material to firms’ business, firms can argue that the
technicalities of algorithms are not material to a reasonable investor.
In cases like that of robo-advisors, some of the technicalities of the
model may be material to investors,191 yet for other far-reaching
business applications of algorithms, firms can avoid disclosure by
arguing that their algorithms are immaterial to investors. As a result,
under the protection of trade secrecy, crucial information on algorithmic
designs and operations cannot be taken from firms and further
scrutinized by corporate shareholders, resulting in no safeguard
against firms developing unreliable algorithms.192 Given the limits of
the existing materiality standard that allows problematic AI business
practices to escape from shareholder and public scrutiny, reforming the
current disclosure standard is of immense significance.
a. Proposed Algorithmic Disclosure Considerations
Considering the nature and impacts of algorithmic opacity, this
Article proposes a new materiality standard that integrates certain
paramount disclosure considerations, such as stakeholder interests,
sustainability, comprehensibility, and minimum necessary principles,
for algorithmic disclosures.
i. Stakeholder Interests
Similar to current practices, to build an effective disclosure
framework that helps control risks associated with algorithmic opacity,
firms would be required to disclose clear, complete, comparable, and
timely information about AI developments, operating results, and perils
for investors to measure the firms’ performances.
However, unlike the current materiality standard, which allows
firms to determine items that may reasonably be considered important
for influencing the decisions of investors, this Article argues that in
191.
IM Guidance Update, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2017-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z85Y-XH88].
192.
See supra Section III.A.2.
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algorithmic disclosure, firms should include items not only concerning
the interests of their investors but also those of other stakeholders in
AI systems. Stakeholders play a key role in deciding the value of AI
systems, including but not limited to investors, employees, algorithm
developers, suppliers, and local communities. Systematic stakeholder
consideration will help strengthen algorithmic accountability across
firms, corporate shareholders, and the public, decreasing dangers posed
by algorithms and false suspicions against opaque applications. Hence,
when determining the materiality of a topic, firms should consider the
impacts of their AI services on all stakeholders and disclose information
they reasonably expect. When facing conflicting expectations among
stakeholders, firms are encouraged to describe how they balance them
in their reports. Whenever information implicates material stakeholder
concerns, it should no longer be shielded by the protection of trade
secrecy and hidden from public scrutiny.
ii. Sustainability Consideration
Second, given that algorithmic opacity is causing unprecedented
perils that penetrate human lives,193 firms have a duty to develop
sustainable algorithms that protect humans and their environments.
Sustainability is defined as a business enterprise’s creation of long-term
value not only for its economic profits but also for the benefits of
stakeholders affected by its commercial practices.194 Without a
sustainability consideration, not only would individuals potentially be
affected, but the larger public may suffer from unexpected damage to
financial profits and democratic norms. A sustainability standard
would require firms to mitigate problems surrounding algorithmic
opacity that implies far-reaching consequences for the larger public.195
This element in the proposed disclosure framework encourages
corporate long-term thinking and encouragement of performance in the
wider context of sustainability, which is absent in the current

193.
See supra Section III.B.
194.
See supra note 32.
195.
See generally Florian Möslein & Karsten Engsig Sørensen, Nudging for Corporate
Long-Termism and Sustainability? Regulatory Instruments from a Comparative and Functional
Perspective, 24 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 391 (2018); see also Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad,
Sustainability in Corporate Law, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/24/sustainability-in-corporate-law/#:~:text=Stavros%20Gadinis%20is%20professor%20of,based%20on%20their%20recent%20paper
[https://perma.cc/4QK9-CLF3].
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framework.196 In this regard, firms using machine-learning algorithms
would be required to describe their strategies, risks, and goals relating
to safe algorithms that benefit the larger public in the long term.
Further, firms would need to describe whether and how their AI
systems could create negative impacts on communities in different
locations.
iii. Comprehensible Disclosure
Third, with the technical opacity involved in advanced
algorithms, stakeholders cannot understand the inner workings and
applications of algorithms without sufficient explanations.197 To
mitigate technical opacity, firms would need to make explanations of
their AI systems comprehensible to people with all levels of expertise.198
Using supporting reasons and illustrations, an adequate explanation
should provide sufficient information that allows stakeholders to
consider the operating results of machine-learning algorithms and their
potential risks.199 Adequate explanations also require firms to open a
legal black box to describe the design and behaviors of AI systems for
stakeholders to measure the perils generated by machine-learning
algorithms.200 Under this requirement, both technical and legal opacity
will be reduced through meaningful explanations that illuminate the
algorithmic design, operating process, performance, and associated
risks previously hidden from public view.

196.
Cf. Barnali Choudhury, Social Disclosure, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 183
(acknowledging “a growing interest in using disclosure rules in corporate and securities law to
achieve social policy goals”).
197.
This is also a core principle proposed by a group of researchers promoting principles
(responsibility, explainability, accuracy, auditability, and fairness) for accountable algorithms. See
Nicholas Diakopoulos, Sorelle Friedler, Marcelo Arenas, Solon Barocas, Michael Hay, Bill Howe,
H.V. Jagadish, Kris Unsworth, Arnaud Sahuguet, Suresh Venkatasubramanian, Christo Wilson,
Cong Yu & Bendert Zevenbergen, Principles for Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact
Statement for Algorithms, FAT/ML, https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms [https://perma.cc/LGM5-RMBH] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
198.
Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the
Transparency Ideal and Its Application Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1, 9
(2018) (“Learning about complex systems means not simply being able to look inside systems or
take them apart. Rather, it means dynamically interacting with them in order to understand how
they behave in relation to their environments.”).
199.
Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh & Carlos Guestrin, “Why Should I Trust
You?” Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier 1–2 (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.04938.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9UDA-6GSL]; Finale Doshi-Velez & Been Kim, Towards A Rigorous Science of
Interpretable Machine Learning 1 (Mar. 2, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.08608.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SH78-K36C].
200.
Ribeiro, et. al., supra note 199; Mukherjee, supra note 89.
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iv. Minimum Necessary Disclosure
Finally, considering the tensions between democratic
transparency and commercial competition, the proposed framework
requires only minimum necessary disclosure—information unnecessary
for public oversight is not required, thus appropriately protecting firms’
trade secrets. In this vein, this Article presents a two-layered disclosure
framework. The first layer is mandatory disclosure, which consists of
items that are most pertinent to producing risks. Mandatory disclosure
requires firms to provide information originally protected by the legal
black box because the very solution to algorithmic opacity is more
knowledge—more knowledge of how firms are building and
using algorithms that make decisions for humans, and more
information about the perils that arise for stakeholders. Not all
information has to be disclosed, but information pertaining to public
interests, such as an unexpected machine-learning-algorithm
malfunction occurring in a driverless car system, should be disclosed.
The second layer is recommending disclosure, which includes items
that firms are encouraged to disclose. For instance, firms using
machine-learning-based AI systems would be encouraged but not
compelled to disclose a test data set for model assessment.
Recommending disclosure is a middle ground that mixes government
regulation with self-regulation. In this way, costly and controversial
requirements will not be imposed on firms. Firms using AI systems can
choose the optimal means by which they will reach their expected goals.
The two-layered disclosure framework adds flexibility and adaptability
for firms to fulfill algorithmic disclosure requirements without
unnecessary government intervention. Although firms are compelled to
satisfy only mandatory disclosure, they are recommended to disclose
additional information, particularly concerning the financial, legal, or
reputational operating consequences of algorithms.
2. Disclosure Topics
The above-mentioned disclosure principles can be integrated
into the existing four disclosure topics of business description, legal
proceedings, risk factors, and management’s discussion and analysis of
financial condition and results of operations (MD&A), which are the
most pertinent nonfinancial factors with respect to algorithmic
disclosure. In the following discussion of these four disclosure topics,
this Article first introduces the current state of regulation, including
Regulation S-K and the SEC sustainability disclosures that can be used
as a conceptual model for algorithmic social disclosures. Next, this
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Article uses filing reports from Artificial Intelligence Technology
Solutions (AITX),201 a firm that extensively uses advanced AI systems
it has developed to automate various intelligent security, concierge and
operational tasks,202 to illustrate the current practices of algorithmic
disclosures under the existing regulatory framework and highlight
deficiencies in disclosure. Then, this Article proposes algorithmic
disclosure requirements for each of these four disclosure topics.
a. Description of Business
i. Current State of Regulation
Currently, Item 101 of Regulation S-K requires firms to describe
their business development over the last five years.203 In the disclosure
documents, firms must address items such as their organizational
structures, major products and services, relationships with business
partners, and competitive situations.204 In general, firms are often
required to explain in detail how they generate revenue. This includes
describing and distinguishing between current business activities and
planned business activities. Because the nature of firms may be altered
by subsequent transactions, the SEC often asks firms to provide
additional essential details about their post-transaction business.
Sometimes, firms are asked to provide clearer disclosure about their
structure and control arrangements.205
With respect to sustainability disclosure, firms should disclose
the compliance costs associated with enacted environmental laws.
The regulation also requires a description of any predicted substantial
expenses for environmental control facilities.206 Firms must pay
attention to legal, technological, and political developments relevant to
climate change.207 If any developments create challenges or

201.
A.I. Tech. Sols. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1–2 (Aug. 28, 2019) [hereinafter AITX
Form 10-K]; A.I. Tech. Sols. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A, Amendment No. 1) 1–2 (Aug. 29,
2019) [hereinafter AITX Form 10-K(A1)]; A.I. Tech. Sols. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A,
Amendment No. 2) 1–2 (Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter AITX Form 10-K(A2)].
202.
AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 1.
203.
17 C.F.R. § 229.101.
204.
Id.; see also Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D.N.Y.
1987); Levine v. NL Indus., Inc., 926 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig.,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,502 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1989); SEC Guidance
on Climate Change Disclosure, supra note 28, at 6293.
205.
SEC Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure, supra note 28.
206.
This requirement applies to the remaining and succeeding fiscal year as well as any
further material periods. Id. at 6295–96.
207.
See id. at 6296.
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opportunities for firms and significantly impact their business, firms
must provide further explanations.208 For example, the SEC expects
firms to explain if there is increased or decreased demand for certain
products or services.209 Firms should also disclose shifts in operating
plans whenever they intend to seize new opportunities, including
proposed acquisitions of equipment or plants.210 With respect to these
matters, the SEC asks firms to consider their own particular facts and
circumstances in evaluating the materiality of these opportunities and
obligations.211
ii. Current Practices and Their Deficiencies
Under current regulations, if the use of algorithms may
materially influence a firm’s organizational structures, major products
and services, relationships with business partners, or competitive
situations, the firm must provide further information on the use of
algorithms. In practice, according to filing reports from AITX,
disclosure of its AI service was described in very general terms.212 AITX
briefly outlined its mission of using AI technology as addressing
costly and difficult problems, omitting several pieces of information
that are material to stakeholders.213 First, to fulfill that mission,
it described several critical AI techniques used in its service,
including “facial recognition,” “cloud services,” and “integrated AI
software/hardware,”214 but it did not specify the types of algorithms it
used. Second, although it explained that its service employed AI-based
software to simulate solutions and developed automated access control
functions through facial recognition, it did not describe the
unpredictability of that software.215 Third, AITX claimed that these AI
technologies helped it to outperform its competitors in its target
market; however, it did not readily explain its competitive conditions,
major customers, or business strategies to address changing market
demands.216 Fourth, in the description of its previous business, AITX
mentioned that its first version of a commercial rugged outdoor security

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 1–6; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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robot was “rejected by customers due to unsatisfactory reliability and
some technical flaws that could not be solved.”217 However, AITX did
not provide additional information on such flaws, and it omitted any
description of the efforts to address previous flaws and how the second
version of mobile robots achieved the desired outcome.218 Instead, AITX
briefly described its available software solutions by mentioning that the
service “has created a variety of front-end and back-end software
solutions to power their ecosystem.”219 Fifth, for manufacturing and
assembly, AITX merely mentioned where it purchased raw materials,
without discussing the organization for and process of building the
algorithm systems.220 Finally, regarding customer acceptance, AITX
stated that its service had been used in a number of industries,
including logistics, real estate, medical service, and retail industries, to
emphasize its service’s practicality, without further discussion of the
material effects of its AI service.221 Based on AITX’s disclosure of
business description, stakeholders are unable to understand any
material information related to the AI system, such as the role of
algorithms in its service, algorithmic design and performance, the
business organization for developing algorithms, and how its AI service
performs in the market.
iii. Proposed Algorithmic Disclosure Requirements
To address algorithmic opacity, effective disclosures in the
description of the business must include firms’ AI products and services,
the institutional framework for developing a machine-learning AI
system, major targeted customers, and competitive conditions. Unlike
the current framework, where firms can choose not to disclose their AI
systems, the proposed framework requires that whenever firms release
a new product based on machine-learning algorithms, they are
compelled to disclose information on that product or service. In order to
help readers understand the workings of algorithms, the disclosure
must explain the desired outcome of the algorithms, what types of
algorithms they are using, and how those algorithms operate in selected
platforms.222 Accordingly, the design concept, crucial components, and
expected outcomes of the algorithms can be understood and scrutinized
by stakeholders.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Mukherjee, supra note 89.
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In response to potential misbehaviors of algorithms that may
cause inequality, injury, or even death, firms must describe the
unpredictability of machine-learning algorithms. Specifically, they
must adequately open the black box by explaining whether and how any
machine-learning operation makes an unexpected move. If there is an
unexpected move, they must explain whether that move is within the
scope of their design function.223 If the actions of an advanced AI system
rely partially on experience following its programming, firms must
periodically update the stability of its performance in the real world.
They are encouraged to prepare a test data set for model assessment.224
In terms of the institutional frameworks in developing learning
algorithms, firms must give stakeholders the ability to measure the
sustainability and maturity of business organizations for their systems.
Specifically, firms must adequately describe the interactions among the
participants that build an AI system, as well as the hardware and
software environments for testing the machine-learning algorithms.225
Moreover, because the AI market is subject to rapid technological
change, firms should to some extent open a commercial black box, such
as updating descriptions to reflect any critical changes in
post-transaction business and describe its current state of business and
future strategies, considering new opportunities or risks that may
materially affect demand for AI business.
b. Legal Proceedings
i. Current State of Regulation
Currently, firms must also disclose all material pending legal
proceedings to which they or their subsidiaries are a party. This
requirement includes the court in which any proceedings are pending,
the date the proceedings are instituted, the principal parties thereto, a
description of the factual basis alleged to underlie the litigation, and
the relief sought. Firms are also required to disclose if a governmental
entity is involved in similar investigations and litigations,226 or if their
property is the subject of a legal proceeding.227

223.
Scherer, supra note 156, at 365 (“[A] computer chess program might make an
unexpected move, but it is still not doing anything other than playing chess.”).
224.
TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF
STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION 222 (2d ed. 2009).
225.
Id.
226.
Id.
227.
17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
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Concerning sustainability, Instruction 5 to Item 103 provides
some specific requirements that apply to disclosure of certain types of
environmental litigation. Firms must describe routine litigation
incidental to the business under three scenarios: (1) such proceedings
are material to the business condition of the firm; (2) proceedings
involve potential charges that exceed 10 percent of the current assets of
the firm; or (3) proceedings involve potential monetary sanctions where
a governmental authority is a party.228
ii. Current Practices and Their Deficiencies
In its filing, AITX did disclose two legal proceedings; however,
neither were concerned with issues associated with algorithms.229 In
the first proceeding, AITX stated that it was sued in a federal district
court for alleged misappropriation of trade secrets through a third
party.230 However, AITX omitted several relevant pieces of information
in the suit, such as the names of the principal parties, the relief sought,
and detailed descriptions of the allegations.231 In the second proceeding,
AITX was sued for alleged nonpayment of fees.232 The firm briefly
described the plaintiff, the damage sought, and the resulting
settlement.233 Under current practices, where legal proceeding
disclosures typically do not include substantial information on
AI-related legal challenges, it is difficult for stakeholders to identify the
potential problems derived from a firm’s operation and estimate how
existing legal proceedings might impact a firm’s outlook and future
financial condition.
In the era of AI, firms using algorithms to make decisions for
people may face an unprecedented number of legal challenges involving
competitors, law enforcement, and other regulatory agencies in the
United States and beyond. As a representative example, in 2018 alone,
Facebook faced numerous state and federal class actions filed against
its platform and user data practices. In addition, its platform and user
data practices became the subject of the FTC, the SEC, state attorneys
general, and other government investigations, not only in the United
228.
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, supra note
28, at 6293.
229.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 14; AITX Form 10-K(A1), supra note 201, at
13–14; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 14.
230.
AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 14.
231.
Id.
232.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 14; AITX Form 10-K(A1), supra note 201, at
13–14; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 14.
233.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 14; AITX Form 10-K(A1), supra note 201, at
13–14; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 14.
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States but also in other jurisdictions, including European countries.234
Any legal challenges could lead to changes in business practices and
have a damaging impact on a firm’s financial condition.235 Legal
proceeding disclosures serve as a good resource for stakeholders to
understand specific misbehaviors hidden by firms under the protection
of trade secrecy. Where the current disclosure framework does not
require legal proceedings disclosures for algorithms, some key facts
associated with the use of advanced algorithms in actions against firms
may be regarded as immaterial and thus escape from stakeholders’
attention.
iii. Proposed Algorithmic Disclosure Requirements
Accordingly, this Article proposes that firms provide information
on the legal consequences of their machine-learning AI systems by
disclosing all material pending legal proceedings associated with their
AI services or products. To reduce algorithmic opacity and strengthen
algorithmic accountability, firms would describe pending legal actions
if their property or actions became subjects of litigation. For example,
if a firm was involved in misuse of consumer data, it should report the
number of complaints and lawsuits it faced associated with breaches of
customer privacy, along with investigations from regulatory agencies,
and the number of estimated losses of customer data. Additionally, it
should provide information on the investigators or name of the court
where the proceedings are pending, the interested parties in such
proceedings, a description of the factual basis alleged that underlies the
litigation, and the relief sought. Specifically, suppose that a firm is
investigated by the FTC because the collection of information from
children’s online mobile devices constitutes a violation of the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).236 The firm should disclose the
following information: (1) how many children’s information was
collected; (2) the alleged fact that it collected the data from children and
enabled it to disclose their personal information on their social
networks without obtaining verifiable parental consent; (3) the date the
matter was investigated; and (4) how the case was resolved. With the
disclosure of legal proceedings, more information on problematic
operating results of algorithms that may have created risks for the
larger public can be discovered and monitored by stakeholders, no
longer hidden from public view.
234.
Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 30 (Jan. 31, 2019).
235.
See id.
236.
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1301–1308,
112 Stat. 2681 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506).
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c. Risk Factor
i. Current State of Regulation
Presently, Item 105 of Regulation S-K requires firms to offer a
discussion of the most significant factors that make investment in the
firm speculative or risky. The SEC often asks firms to describe their
own risks based upon their specific facts and circumstances rather than
describing risks that could apply to any firms in the industry.237 Firms
must describe the risk in a concise and organized manner and explain
the impacts of the risk.238 Past incidents involving stakeholders, such
as suppliers or customers, may be necessary when crafting risk factor
disclosure. Contextual disclosure should be included if it can effectively
communicate risks to investors.
Concerning sustainability disclosure, firms may be required to
disclose risk factors with respect to existing or pending legislation or
regulation concerning climate change.239 In risk factor disclosure, the
SEC requires firms to cover all specific risks associated with climate
change legislation or regulation and avoid a generic risk factor
disclosure that could apply to any firm.240 To illustrate, a firm should
distinguish the nature and extent of the risks it faces in its industry
from its counterparts in other industry sectors.241 The impact of risk on
a firm’s reputation is another important consideration.242 For example,
based upon the nature of a firm’s business and its sensitivity to public
opinion, a firm may have to consider whether the public’s perception of
any publicly available information relating to its greenhouse gas
emissions could expose the firm to potential adverse consequences to its
operation due to reputation damage.243 Also, a firm whose businesses
may be vulnerable to severe weather or climate-related events should
consider disclosing material risks and outcomes associated with such
events in its public disclosure documents.244

237.
17 C.F.R. § 229.105.
238.
Id.
239.
Id.; see SEC Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure, supra note 28, at 6296–97.
240.
17 C.F.R. § 229.105; see SEC Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure, supra note 28,
at 6296–97.
241.
SEC Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure, supra note 28, at 6296–97.
242.
Id. at 6296.
243.
Id.
244.
Id.
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ii. Current Practices and Their Deficiencies
The disclosure reports filed by AITX barely disclosed AI-related
risks in risk factor disclosure.245 The portion that was most pertinent to
AI risks concerned firms’ use of data and compliance with legislation.
Based on the SEC requirement, a firm must state that its AI services
are in compliance with existing privacy laws and the corporate policies
of clients.246 However, AITX did not address whether privacy laws
affected the development and operation of algorithms in detail, nor did
it explain the specific regulations that incurred costs.247 In addition, no
information about how the firm would respond to changing legislation
that may impact its AI-based service was included.
AITX briefly stated that such regulations may limit its
development of AI services in its targeted market.248 Other risks AITX
noted included those that may occur in every firm, such as when it
stated that “[its] success is not guaranteed and will depend on an
unproven market, the efforts to rent its product, and adoption of
physical security technology and their products.”249 Finally, it described
several risks less relevant to algorithms, such as adversely affected
intangible assets due to failure to protect intellectual property; the fact
that it had “no employment agreement in place with [their] executive
officers or directors;”250 “the loss of key personnel,” which could harm
its business;251 and “economic factors and financial results [that
could] fluctuate and affect the future operation.”252 Despite mentioning
its failure with a previous version of robot service in its business
description, AITX did not mention it in its risk factor disclosure.253 In
sum, the firm omitted information about the vulnerable operation and
material prior incidents it had experienced, despite admitting to the
incident under other disclosure topics.254 It is unknown how many
controversial incidents have been hidden from view, how these hidden
245.
See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 8–13; AITX Form 10-K(A1), supra note 201,
at 7–13; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 8–13.
246.
See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 11; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at
11.
247.
See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 11; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at
11.
248.
See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 11; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at
11.
249.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 8; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 8.
250.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 9; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 9.
251.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 9; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 9.
252.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 9; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 9.
253.
See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 9; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 9.
254.
See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 9; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 9.

144

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:1:99

incidents might endanger the public, and how AITX actually mitigated
the risks of such incidents.255 Additionally, although AITX claimed that
it was using several cutting-edge AI technologies, such as facial
recognition, cloud service, and integrated AI software, the firm did not
mention the control risks associated with advanced algorithms,
including how control over advanced algorithms can be lost as they
learn new data.256 Accordingly, the risks it disclosed were too vague for
stakeholders to detect flaws in the algorithms and the resulting risks.
Under current practices, firms are able to conceal critical risks in their
AI systems without consequence. As a result, firms can operate their AI
services in a black box, trading people’s safety, privacy, and equality
without being challenged.
The risks posed by algorithms differ from the risks incurred by
other kinds of technologies. As mentioned,257 algorithmic opacity
creates a series of problems that erode fundamental rights and
endanger human safety. As the scale of risk posed by algorithms grows,
an effective disclosure framework would help control risks associated
with algorithmic opacity. The current disclosure framework does not
specify what forms of risk are subject to disclosure, leading to firms’
omissions of substantial risks posed by algorithms. To promote
meaningful algorithmic disclosures, firms using machine-learning
systems should take into account the potential materiality of any
identified risks and offer a discussion of risk factors that make AI
systems or investment in the firm speculative or risky. The impacts of
AI-related incidents on firms’ operating results and the public should
also be considered. There are several items for firms to consider in risk
factor disclosures.
iii. Proposed Algorithmic Disclosure Requirements
First, to reduce risks associated with firms’ failures to respond
to the changing landscape of AI regulations, the SEC should require
firms to provide information on how they address risks derived from
any approved or pending legislation that relates to the building of
an AI system. For instance, firms using AI systems in the
medical industry should consider the FDA’s new guidelines on high-risk
machine-learning-based AI systems.258 Likewise, health care providers
255.
at 8–13.
256.
at 8–13.
257.
258.

See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 8–13; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201,
See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 8–13; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201,
See supra Section III.B.
Hale, supra note 146.
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that collect data from users should describe the risks from HIPAA data
privacy restrictions, which specifically prohibit unauthorized use or
disclosure of protected health information.259
Second, there are several risks that accompany opaque
machine-learning algorithms that should specifically be disclosed in
detail. As mentioned before, machine-learning algorithms not only
create problems of unexpectedness but also raise issues of
uncontrollability. It is possible that firms could lose control of AI
systems designed to learn and adapt continuously.260 Loss of control in
AI systems may thus carry a degree of risk that surpasses the risks
posed by human behavior.261 For these reasons, firms should provide
explanations of risk factors in detail to inform their readers of how their
systems maintain effective control of AI systems and serve the public
interest.262 When the SEC requires firms to explain the risks posed by
opaque machine-learning algorithms, the public can scrutinize the
inner workings and operating results of their algorithms. Meanwhile,
firms will have a stronger incentive to address the risks derived from
the unpredictability of algorithms to avoid being challenged by
stakeholders over their AI products and services.263
In this regard, the SEC should require firms to consider
the following issues when preparing disclosures: (1) prior AI incidents
experienced by the firm that are material; (2) the severity and
frequency of prior incidents, including a description of the
consequences; (3) the business and organizational structure that may
create material AI risks, including industry-specific risks and supply
chain risks; (4) description of the ongoing risks; (5) how ongoing risks
affect the firm, including the potential for reputational harm and
litigation and regulatory investigation associated with AI risks; (6) the
likelihood of AI incidents occurring; (7) the estimated severity of
inherent AI risks; (8) the adequacy of the way the firm addresses those
risks, outsources functions that contain material AI risks, and prevents
such risks from reoccurring; (9) the limits of the firm’s ability to reduce

259.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103. To be covered by HIPAA, firms must process and transmit
protected health information in a standard HIPAA format, otherwise they are not covered entities
regulated by HIPAA. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 115, at 513–14.
260.
Scherer, supra note 156.
261.
Id.
262.
See id.
263.
See WIM BARTELS, TERESA FOGELBERG, ARAB HOBALLAH & CORNELIS T. VAN DER
LUGT, KPMG ET AL., CARROTS & STICKS: GLOBAL TRENDS IN SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
REGULATION AND POLICY (2016), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/05/carrotsand-sticks-may-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W6N-Z6BK].
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AI risks; and (10) any form of undetected AI risks that may emerge in
the future.264
Third, the SEC should require firms to disclose indirect risk
concerning the impact on firms’ reputations that affects firms’
shareholder value. Depending on firms’ reliance on reputation and
vulnerability to criticism, firms may have to consider any public
information concerning their AI business that may make their
operating results or financial conditions suffer from reputational
damage. Consider the case of Facebook: due to a series of controversies
associated with its AI system—the Cambridge Analytica scandal,
election-manipulating misinformation, anti-conservative bias, security
breaches, and charges of privacy violations—its reputation has been
severely tarnished.265 Firms should consider this kind of reputational
damage and consider whether they may run the risk of losing users,
decreasing the time users spend on their service, and impacting how
much users are willing to share.
Finally, under the comprehensible disclosure principle, the SEC
should require firms to describe their AI risks and relevant AI incidents
in context. If a firm experienced an AI incident where an unexpected
algorithm malfunction occurred in its self-driving car system and
caused a car to drive out of control, the firm must provide sufficient
background information on this incident, including possible causes,
negative consequences, and proposed solutions. Firms must provide
comprehensive descriptions of AI risks to an extent that stakeholders
can directly measure the risks faced by the firm. Material information
regarding AI risks and incidents must be based upon firms’ specific
circumstances and must not be misleading. As with other management
risks, the SEC should encourage firms to regularly reexamine the
adequacy of their risk factor disclosure.
Given the information asymmetries accompanied by opaque
algorithms that can incur widespread and cascading dangers, mapping
the algorithmic disclosure framework becomes particularly necessary
to open the black box. These proposed disclosure requirements will help
stakeholders by preventing firms from using current disclosure
requirements that fail to consider the nature of algorithmic opacity to

264.
See SEC Statement and Guidance on Cybersecurity Disclosures, supra note 29.
265.
Scott Rosenberg, Facebook’s Reputation Is Sinking Fast, AXIOS (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.axios.com/facebook-reputation-drops-axios-harris-poll-0d6c406a-4c2e-463a-af981748d3e0ab9a.html [https://perma.cc/TNE5-QUQ4].
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control the risks, enhancing algorithmic transparency, and reducing
hazards derived from opaque algorithms as a result.266
d. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations (MD&A)
i. Current State of Regulation
Pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K, firms must disclose
their financial condition, changes in financial condition, and operating
results.267 This includes disclosing their known business trends,
demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties that might have a
material impact on their financial condition.268 Firms are also required
to illustrate the quality of and changes in cash flows and earnings, so
investors can estimate their performance and discuss how they predict
their financial situation to compare to their current performance.269
On sustainability disclosure, Item 303 requires firms to assess
whether any enacted climate change legislation or regulation is
reasonably likely to materially affect the firm’s financial condition or
results of operations. If a certain law or regulation is pending, firms
should generally presume the pending legislation or regulation will be
enacted and determine whether it will affect their financial condition or
operating results.270 If there is such a possibility, then the SEC requires
firms to describe that potential effect.271 New business trends or risks
associated with climate change, such as increased demand for new
products or services, or decreased demand for existing products or
services, may also be required to be disclosed as risk factors or in MD&A
disclosure.272

266.
Ananny & Crawford, supra note 198, at 9 (pointing out that “[t]ransparency concerns
are commonly driven by a certain chain of logic: observation produces insights which create the
knowledge required to govern and hold systems accountable”).
267.
17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
268.
Id.
269.
17 C.F.R. § 229.303. In the reviews of reporting reverse mergers, firms are often asked
to “identify any significant elements of historical income or loss that will not continue in the
company’s post-transaction operations.” Id.
270.
SEC Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure, supra note 28, at 6296.
271.
The firm would also have to consider disclosure of the difficulties, if material, involved
in assessing the timing and effect of the pending legislation or regulation. See id.
272.
Id.
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ii. Current Practices and Their Deficiencies
In practice, AITX mentioned very little about its AI system in
its MD&A.273 Using AI-driven systems and cloud services, the firm’s
business operation focused on services designed to automate security
tasks and solutions.274 With respect to AI systems, AITX claimed that
its solutions were provided by users’ monthly subscription fees, and all
elements of systems consisting of hardware and software design were
owned by the firm.275 The disclosed information offered little help in
reducing algorithmic opacity that may cause damage to the firm and
the public. The filing reports omitted information specifying the
business trends, demands, commitment, and uncertainties of AITX’s AI
service, in spite of its important role in the performance of its
business.276 It is unclear how AITX made efforts to comply with
regulations and prevented the occurrence of common dangers and legal
concerns created by AI systems, such as denial of health care services
based on discriminatory algorithms or consumer privacy invasion due
to misuse of data.277 Under current practices, stakeholders have no way
to understand how AITX tailors an adequate management plan to
develop accountable AI services that have enormous impacts on the its
financial condition.278 AITX’s MD&A illustrates how firms can relax
standards designed to protect users’ privacy, equality, and safety, since
they are allowed to operate their algorithms without a comprehensive
consideration of corresponding legal consequences and adequate
managerial approaches.
As AI becomes the private industry’s focus of development and
source of profits, the use of algorithms in the private sector has a great
impact on firms’ financial conditions. Yet, under the current disclosure
framework, very few firms, if any, substantially disclose management
discussion of the operating results of algorithms. Without pressure from
public scrutiny, firms are less likely to establish managerial approaches
that address financial problems resulting from algorithmic opacity. To
incentivize firms to develop business strategies toward trustable
273.
See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 18–25; AITX Form 10-K(A1), supra note 201,
at 17–23; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 18–25.
274.
See AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 19; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at
19.
275.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 19; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 19.
276.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 8–11; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at
8–11.
277.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 11, 19; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at
11, 19.
278.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 18–19; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at
18–19.
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algorithms, this Article’s proposed disclosure framework would require
firms to include specific algorithmic consideration in their MD&A
disclosures. The SEC should require firms to consider known
AI-associated trends, demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties
that will have a material impact on their financial conditions. In this
context, firms must consider the cost of developing AI systems, the costs
of regulatory compliance, and other consequences of AI-related
incidents. To encourage firms to develop AI systems with fewer threats
of algorithmic opacity, the SEC should require firms to provide
necessary management plans and information on the results of
operations with far-reaching impacts on their financial conditions.
iii. Proposed Algorithmic Disclosure Requirements
First, firms would need to describe their data management plan,
not only because of data’s significant role in creating efficient and
legitimate algorithmic applications but also because of the complex
privacy regulatory landscape and the growing number of costly legal
proceedings associated with misuse of data.279 With respect to the data
management plan, firms would need to disclose how they collect,
develop, manage, and utilize data for AI-relevant services. Because
many violations begin with incidents caused by employees unaware of
privacy regulations,280 firms would need to mention their approach to
ensuring the protection of customer privacy, including how they secure
customer data, educate employees, and adopt measures to protect data
they obtain, process, or transfer.281 Firms would also need to describe
whether and how they use customer information for any other purposes,
as well as how they communicate changes in their privacy policy to
customers.
Second, firms would need to disclose their management
approach to building nondiscriminatory AI systems. Given that
the opaque application of algorithms replicates inequality or
misrepresents the public,282 algorithmic opacity can lead to illegitimate
decision-making processes that encroach on fundamental rights and
erode trust in firms using such algorithms. Although reducing bias has

279.
See supra Sections III.B.1, III.C.
280.
For the US system of consumer data privacy regulation, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 115, at 786–90.
281.
See id. at 533 (“Many of the FTC resolution agreements involving monetary
settlements and fines began with an incident. Some of these incidents were caused by one employee
or small group of employees. . . . An incident can spark an investigation by HHS, and this
investigation can uncover more than just the particular violation that led to the incident.”).
282.
See supra Section III.B.2.

150

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:1:99

become a general expectation of socially responsible conduct in today’s
society, particularly the one after COVID-19 that aims at mitigating
systematic discrimination,283 the current disclosure framework barely
considers the surrounding impact of discrimination on firms’ financial
conditions. To reduce the inequality hidden in algorithms, this Article’s
proposed disclosure framework would require firms to disclose
discrimination impact assessments that include incidents associated
with discrimination and describe their preventive measures against
discrimination.284 Specifically, they must provide information hidden
from the public, such as how they select raw data, ensure equality when
developing algorithms, and apply algorithms in business applications
that have decision-making power regarding people’s employment,
promotion, access to medical systems, and so forth. Accordingly, they
would be required to make an effort to promote equality in the
applications of algorithms, as firms can no longer conceal their
managerial approaches to algorithms from stakeholders.285
Third, safety is a desirable goal of AI applications that must be
explained by firms because the existence of algorithmic opacity
inevitably hinders adequate surveillance of safe AI systems. As AI
products and services are expected to complete their tasks safely, firms
would be required to provide information on the safeness of their AI
systems, which is absent from today’s disclosure framework. To ensure
that firms provide a safe AI system, the proposed framework
requires firms to consider safety’s impact on their algorithm
applications.286 Specifically, firms would need to report percentages of
machine-learning-based products and services for which safety impacts
are assessed for improvement. They would also need to disclose the
number of incidents derived from breaching safety regulations (e.g.,
driverless cars). For firms whose businesses are likely to cause safety
concerns or are especially vulnerable to severe AI incidents, such as the
autonomous vehicle industry, they must disclose an estimated risk
control and effectiveness report in the risk factor disclosure that
283.
See Address ‘Appalling Impact’ of COVID-19 on Minorities, UN Rights Chief Urges,
UN NEWS (June 2, 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/06/1065272 [https://perma.cc/4CC36B6M].
284.
The impact assessment is originated from environmental law and recently promoted
by several scholars, see Katyal, supra note 3, at 111–17. For a discussion of impact statements in
policing, see Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017).
285.
See generally IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO
GET THINGS DONE (2010).
286.
See Katyal, supra note 3, at 110–17; see also Josephine Wolff, How to Improve
Cybersecurity for Artificial Intelligence, BROOKINGS INST. (June 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-improve-cybersecurity-for-artificial-intelligence/
[https://perma.cc/
C64Y-T6L2].
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explains how they test their products or services using
machine-learning algorithms to ensure the safety of both users and
developers.
Fourth, in addition to the management plans and impact reports
mentioned above, other aspects that may influence financial conditions
are still hidden from public scrutiny due to trade secret protection. For
instance, successful adoption of machine-learning systems requires
high levels of expertise, which can become a substantial impediment to
firm managers without adequate levels of expertise in evaluating the
risks of machine-learning systems. The SEC should therefore require
firms to disclose how they reevaluate and rebuild their strategic
alliances and business models in response to machine-learning systems,
including hiring algorithm scientists and collaborating with alliances to
develop application solutions and how they posit themselves in their
broader AI business ecosystem.287
Fifth, because corporate mergers or acquisitions often involve a
significant degree of risk or effect on firms’ long-term development, the
SEC should require firms to disclose relevant acquisitions, mergers,
intellectual capital, and other concerns emergent in the AI community,
and how relevant changes in the organization affect their financial
operation and future position in the burgeoning AI market.288
Sixth, the SEC should require firms to be transparent about the
quality of and changes in AI-related earnings and cash flows for
investors to more accurately measure their financial situation and
estimate their future performance. In addition to disclosing material
transaction activities like reverse mergers,289 the SEC may ask firms to
describe any substantial AI-caused income or loss that does not extend
to their post-transaction operations. In addition, the SEC should
encourage firms to pay attention to any other costs or consequences
associated with risk that are reasonably likely to affect the firm’s
287.
See Michael Ehret & Jochen Wirtz, Unlocking Value from Machines: Business Models
and the Industrial Internet of Things, 33 J. MKTG. MGMT. 111, 115–25 (2016) (using
entrepreneurship and transaction cost theories to examine business models for the IoT techniques
and how to further transform risks into commercial opportunities).
288.
For instance, in 2018, Apple acquired Silk Labs, Oracle acquired DataFox, Microsoft
made five acquisitions that included XOXOCO and Lobe. Some of them disclosed the terms of
deals, while most of them acquired for an undisclosed amount. 30 Major Technology Acquisitions
in 2018, EURIUN TECHS. (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.euriun.com/tech/30-major-technology-acquisitions-2018/ [https://perma.cc/VX6S-46NV]; Mikey Campbell, Apple Reportedly Acquires AI
Startup Silk Labs, APPLE INSIDER, https://appleinsider.com/articles/18/11/21/apple-reportedly-acquires-ai-startup-silk-labs [https://perma.cc/5NLC-VV9L] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
289.
According to the SEC, a reverse merger is a transaction where a private firm acquires
a public reporting company to go public and obtain its access to funding in the capital markets.
See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR BULLETIN: REVERSE MERGERS 1 (June 9, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reversemergers.pdf [https://perma.cc/JNX4-4EBK].
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operating results or financial condition and disclose how likely it is that
this AI risk will lead to increased protection expenditures290 or reduced
revenues.291
Seventh, the SEC should require firms to evaluate whether any
legislation will likely exert a substantial impact on their financial
situation or operating results. For example, under the proposed
disclosure framework, firms would need to consider legislation and
regulations that may limit the use of AI systems and cause associated
costs or litigation threats to firms. In terms of the cost of regulation
compliance, firms would need to disclose all pending or enacted
regulations that may affect their building of AI systems, including
regulations and legislation on information privacy, civil laws, and
cross-border rules that apply to their systems.292 Last but not least,
firms would also need to include new business trends or risks associated
with AI in risk factors or MD&A disclosure.
In sum, to encourage firms to develop accountable algorithms
that further consumer interests and human welfare in the long term, a
disclosure system that sheds more light on harmful algorithmic opacity
is necessary. Such disclosure requirements should not only concern
technical information associated with AI systems but also the
interactions of AI systems and stakeholders. Without new guidance on
algorithmic disclosures, the SEC’s materiality standard is so general
and ambiguous that firms are not obligated to disclose much critical
information relevant to AI risks. Because no existing disclosure
requirement explicitly refers to algorithms and AI systems, firms have
considerable freedom to disclose only those facts that are favorable to

290.
As protection costs increase, it may bring about organizational changes, additional
staff training, an increased protection scheme, expert engagement, legal proceedings, and
compliance costs. See R. Douglas Harmon, Cybersecurity Disclosure Heats Up, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 4,
2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dbedee7c-4936-42be-be45-9da94877d104
[https://perma.cc/SZU6-QGZM]. Also, following an incident, firms have to bear remediation costs
to rebuild their goodwill and attract customers to continue business relationships. See Global
Cyber Executive Briefing, DELOITTE: INSIGHTS, https://www2.deloitte.com/gz/en/pages/risk/articles/Global-Cyber-Briefing.html [https://perma.cc/7FNL-VAU5].
291.
Lost revenue may be caused by misuse of data or the loss of customers after an
incident, legal proceedings, reputation damage, and the loss of competitive advantage. See Global
Cyber Executive Briefing, supra note 290. Firms in an industry vulnerable to AI incidents should
disclose the description of relevant insurance coverage and the cost of maintaining insurance in
response to potential loss of revenue. See generally Ram Shankar Siva Kumar & Frank Nagle, The
Case for AI Insurance, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/the-case-for-ai-insurance [https://perma.cc/7YJ5-LRKE].
292.
The disclosure of any material estimated capital expenditures for AI control facilities
for its remaining and succeeding fiscal year are to be covered by the MD&A disclosure. See 17
C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(2); SEC Statement and Guidance on Cybersecurity Disclosures, supra note 29,
at 8170.
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their business, leaving the most problematic operations out of public
view. As analyzed previously, current filing reports demonstrate firms’
reluctance to disclose substantial information on algorithmic matters
and resistance to disclosing relevant risks and incidents.293 With legal
and technical opacity inherent in their algorithms, the law allows firms
to conceal algorithmic information in detail, although the risks of
algorithms may be considered material to firms’ businesses and to the
public. To mitigate algorithmic opacity, this Article’s proposed
algorithmic disclosure requirements under the SEC disclosure
framework imposes obligations to disclose AI items. With obligations to
disclose, the technicalities and commercial applications of algorithms
can be scrutinized by stakeholders for risks. As a result, these risks to
the larger public and firms themselves will be identified, controlled, and
mitigated in due course.
V. LIMITATIONS, POSSIBILITIES, AND IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED
DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
In an era where AI firms dominate the development of
algorithms, accountable AI products and services are possible if specific
corners of commercial practices can be examined and monitored. As the
scale of risks posed by algorithms is no less serious than that posed by
previous technologies, this Article proposes a new disclosure framework
for AI systems through the lens of the SEC’s disclosure framework. This
framework considers the technical traits of algorithms, potential
dangers of AI systems, and regulatory governance systems in light of
increasing AI incidents. In the previous Sections, the proposed
framework addresses both opacity resulting from intentional operations
aimed at hiding certain information that may adversely affect financial
profits and opacity resulting from unintentional operations due to the
complexities of algorithms’ technical attributes. From a theoretical
perspective, however, there are some limitations with this new
disclosure framework—the SEC may not have the authority to regulate
AI firms’ behaviors, the proposed disclosures may remain uncertain
direct practicability, and the disclosure requirements can be inherent
in high costs.
First, one may argue that while the SEC has broad power to
protect the investing public, it may not have the authority to require
firms using AI systems to take into account the benefit of stakeholders
other than corporate shareholders. In addition, one may question
293.
AITX Form 10-K, supra note 201, at 18–25; AITX Form 10-K(A1), supra note 201, at
17–23; AITX Form 10-K(A2), supra note 201, at 18–25.
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whether the SEC has the power to make firms disclose information that
may reveal their trade secrets. Second, even if the SEC has the power
to regulate algorithmic disclosure, disclosed information may be
downplayed, and firms may focus on legitimate details of their use of AI
systems to bolster their reputation and avoid criticism.294 Meanwhile,
given that the proposed disclosure framework only applies to public
firms, firms using AI systems can avoid the SEC disclosure
requirements by choosing not to go public and staying private, and
continue to operate their AI systems in opacity. Third, even if the SEC
can ensure that disclosure requirements applying to public firms will
produce useful information, disclosure itself does not absolutely
guarantee good behavior.295 Fourth, despite recognition of positive
impacts on disclosures, one may argue that the compliance cost for the
disclosure requirement is too high, or that the practicability of
disclosure is uncertain.296
Despite such potential limits, this proposal opens up more
possibilities to regulate algorithmic opacity for several reasons. First,297
the SEC has substantive power to enact disclosure rules and reshape
the monitoring rules for firms using AI systems. Corporate
shareholders also need sufficient information to evaluate firms’
performance and outlook when making investment decisions.
Algorithmic disclosure requirements allow them to make sound
judgments by discerning risks and comparing firms’ managerial
approaches to developing and using advanced algorithms. The broader
sustainability disclosure requirements enacted by the SEC, which exist
for more than solely the investing public, also justify the proposed
algorithmic sustainability disclosures benefiting more than just
corporate shareholders. Additionally, rather than asking firms to
disclose an indeterminate amount of information on their trade secrets,
the proposed algorithmic disclosures, like the existing SEC
cybersecurity disclosures, should not jeopardize the core secrecy of
commercially valuable information and should only require minimum
necessary disclosures that concern the best practices and the
problematic use of their AI systems. Firms might also need a regime
that gives the SEC discretion to enter their private areas because such
294.
See Rüdiger Hahn & Regina Lülfs, Legitimizing Negative Aspects in GRI-Oriented
Sustainability Reporting: A Qualitative Analysis of Corporate Disclosure Strategies, 123 J. BUS.
ETHICS 401, 409–13 (2013).
295.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1023, 1023–24 (2000).
296.
See David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the
Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 330–31, 335–36 (2011).
297.
See supra Part I, Section IV.A.
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authority reduces the likelihood that stakeholder concerns or
government sanctions will be imposed based on false and unverifiable
suspicions.
Second, even if the information firms provide may be
marginalized, it provides more clues for stakeholders to monitor AI
firms. Firms using machine-learning algorithms would be required, as
a condition of fulfilling disclosure obligations, to allow the SEC to open
the black box for stakeholder inspection. As a result, such disclosed
information serves as a valuable resource for the public to investigate
firms’ AI systems. If information can be drawn from firms, those firms
will have to specify how they build reliable AI products and services
from the very start. By doing so, firms are more likely to develop
accountable algorithms and AI systems. Even if the SEC disclosure
requirements do not apply to private firms, the proposed algorithmic
disclosure framework is a workable first step that applies to at least a
large portion of industry actors to reduce algorithmic opacity. With a
robust algorithmic disclosure framework, the SEC can measure its
advantages and shortcomings and further decide when and how to
extend algorithmic disclosures to private firms. Thus, the proposed
disclosure framework can help establish a more well-rounded
disclosure and transparency standard for the private sector.
Third, although disclosures do not guarantee good algorithmic
behavior, they will incentivize firms to develop accountable algorithms.
If the law requires algorithmic disclosures, firms will have a substantial
incentive to restructure their environments to monitor the operating
results and develop sustainable strategic management of their
machine-learning algorithms. Because disclosure makes it easier for
the public to detect firms’ illegal or unethical behaviors and compare
their performances, firms will face more surveillance and strive harder
to reach public standards in a competitive AI market. To avoid liability
and risking their reputation, firms will avoid behaviors that pose risks
to the larger public. Additionally, with the obligation of disclosure
toward safe algorithms, firms will have a strong motive to develop
value-enhancing algorithms.298 This is also consistent with what
scholars have recently suggested—that the greatest source of
transformation of AI systems are firms’ efforts to develop algorithms
that integrate democratic principles with a machine-learning model.299
In this vein, the law will not be the only factor that regulates firms.
Algorithmic design will work hand-in-hand with democratic rules. Such
298.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).
299.
For an analysis of Katyal’s suggestions for codes of conduct, see Katyal, supra note 3,
at 108–11.
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a regulatory incentive will be useful to overcome the resistance of firms
to disclose their use of algorithms under the protection of trade secrecy.
Fourth, disclosure requirements will incur costs to firms, but
firms will profit if they develop stable, safe, and qualified AI services
and products. Additionally, financial profits should be subordinate to
public concerns, especially in the new generation of AI perils. Recently,
even California, the most innovative economy in the United States,300
has imposed burdensome privacy rules that require disclosure
obligations despite strong industry opposition.301 Only through such
algorithmic disclosure requirements will firms think critically about
streamlining the process of developing accountable algorithms, finding
an efficient way to meet disclosure obligations. The government should
provide funding to help start-ups create accountable algorithms and
comply with increased disclosure burdens, which will benefit every
participant in society. Disclosure requirements will also significantly
reduce the cost to the government of monitoring firms that operate
machine-learning algorithms.
Fifth, the proposed disclosure framework is an ideal regulatory
approach that creates a twilight zone between pure legal regulation and
complete self-regulation. Given the reluctance of government to enact
legislation that materially regulates the development and application
of algorithms, disclosure requirements provide firms with more freedom
of choice. The SEC has the power to require and encourage disclosure
obligations, while firms can define how to build a sustainable and
accountable AI system and choose the means that best suit their specific
circumstances to achieve regulatory goals. This regulatory approach is
less coercive and more cost-effective than direct controls.
Sixth, this proposal attempts to strike a balance between
stakeholders’ interests in disclosure and firms’ interests in trade
secrecy. On the one hand, given the increasing frequency and
magnitude of AI incidents, the proposed disclosure framework requires
firms to include additional algorithmic disclosure, especially in their
description of risk factors. On the other hand, to ease firms’ burdens
from disclosure requirements, the redesigned disclosure framework
presents a scaled disclosure obligation that compels minimum

300.
Shelly Hagan & Wei Lu, California Is the Most Innovative Economy in America,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2019, 9:11 PM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/california-is-no1-massachusetts-no-2-in-u-s-innovation-rank [https://perma.cc/DZG5-7YTS].
301.
See Tony Romm, California Adopted the Country’s First Major Consumer Privacy Law.
Now, Silicon Valley Is Trying to Rewrite It, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2019, 10:26 AM),
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necessary disclosure.302 The proposed framework does not intend to
require mandatory disclosure of low-risk AI systems, such as those
designed to perform simple routine tasks.303 Instead, this framework
only requires disclosures of higher-risk AI systems in the private
sector—those employing machine-learning algorithms whose opacity
may lead to risks to stakeholders.304 By doing so, the proposed
regulatory strategy attempts to avoid the risk of imposing unreasonably
burdensome, intrusive, or costly disclosure requirements.
Given the limitations and possibilities of the proposed
algorithmic disclosure framework, the new requirements have a
profound impact on firms’ managerial approaches to developing and
using algorithms, as the proposed framework will showcase firms’
behaviors by requiring descriptions of data used for decision-making,
the computational environment utilized, and the context of the
algorithmic design and deployment. Under the proposed disclosure
framework, firms will produce technical explanations that explain the
complex techniques inherent in machine-learning algorithms, disclose
selective information about the inner workings of algorithms that have
been previously claimed as trade secrets, and facilitate social dialogue
between firms and stakeholders.305 Through disclosures of business
descriptions, legal proceedings, risk factors, and MD&A, technical
opacity will be reduced because firms are required to illustrate the
functions, features, and unpredictability of their AI systems in
understandable language under their business description disclosure
requirements. Legal opacity will be eased because, in the business
description disclosure, firms must disclose the inner workings of
algorithms and will thus have a motive to manage all participants and
components in a project to ensure that algorithms are accountable. The
dangers of algorithmic opacity will be better controlled as firms must
consider preventative measures and report unexpected changes in risk
factors and MD&A disclosure. Risks will thus be identified early on
because much more information will be disclosed for necessary
assessment.

302.
By doing so, it prevents overregulation that stifles innovation in the private sector.
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303.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the age of AI, opacity is one of the greatest perils facing
humans today. No one put it better than Justice Louis Brandeis when
he said that “[s]unlight is . . . the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman.”306 It may not be possible to stop firms’
domination in developing algorithms in the next century, but it is
crucial to ensure that algorithms are harmless by requiring more
transparency to mitigate algorithmic opacity. It is not too late to
prevent the private sector’s invisible hand from making wrong or
illegitimate decisions for citizens, if light can guide firms in the right
direction at the proper time. With the emerging risks of algorithmic
opacity, corporations need to bear the responsibility of disclosing
information in ways that benefit not just corporate shareholders, but
society as a whole. As firms increasingly acquire and develop
machine-learning systems in support of their operations, they should
have a duty to disclose in a manner that ensures interpretability,
explanation, and transparency.307
The representative case of Facebook has shown the enormous
damage caused by algorithmic opacity to users, investors, citizens,
firms, the capital market, and society—and the recorded incidents are
just the tip of the iceberg. Although AI incidents are growing at an
unprecedented scale, few, if any, legal regimes require firms to engage
in social disclosure of their algorithms. A disclosure framework that
defines accountable corporate governance has moved forward, but the
emerging economies shaped by algorithms are invited to embrace the
existence of algorithmic opacity.
This Article has explored the impacts, possibilities, and limits of
using a disclosure framework under corporate securities law to reduce
opacity in privately owned AI systems. Despite its limitations, the
proposed disclosure framework can be used as a model to ensure that
the operations of machine-learning AI systems are explained and
monitored. By adopting such a regulatory approach, firms will be
incentivized to address issues surrounding algorithmic opacity, develop
algorithms that protect democratic norms in society, consider the
interests of corporate shareholders, and promote broader alignment of
capital markets with the goal of accountability in the age of AI.
306.
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Accordingly, such an algorithmic disclosure framework can help
enhance transparency and promote compliance with the law and
democratic standards for advanced AI systems to reduce the risks posed
to stakeholders, stabilize capital markets, and promote sustainability
in the long run.

